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International Pressure to Harmonize

[I]t is at least problematical whether an unjust sentence against a
foreigner . . . would not, if unredressed, be an aggression upon his
sovereign, as well as one which violated the stipulations in a treaty
or the general law of nations.1

— Alexander Hamilton
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has long lectured about the rule of law to
other countries—traditionally to Latin America, but lately also to
Asia, Africa, and eastern Europe.2 Americans emphasize that the rule
of law is necessary to those who participate in the global economy.
The U.S. government and private organizations have done more
than lecture; they have devoted considerable resources to helping
other countries establish effective legal systems.3 Public and private

1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 476–77 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
2. See, e.g., Remarks on the New Markets Legislation Agreement, 36 WKLY. COMP.
PRES. DOC. 1192 (May 23, 2000) (President Clinton urging the importance of advancing the
rule of law in China); Development Beyond Economies, THE GLEANER, May 11, 2000, available
in 2000 WL 12119344 (describing Economic and Social Progress Report of the InterAmerican Development Bank, arguing that Latin America must improve its adherence to the
rule of law and strengthen weak judiciary); Thaksina Khaikaew, U.S. Urges Asia to Tackle Cronyism for Economic Stability, Associated Press, July 28, 2000 (Secretary of State Madeleine Albright urging Southeast Asian countries to strengthen the rule of law and curb official corruption and cronyism); Al Laranjeiro, U. Florida Conference Addresses State’s Benefits from Latin
American Trade, U-WIRE, May 30, 2000, available in 2000 WL 21058142 (U.S. Special Envoy to the Americas Buddy McKay Jr. calling for “transparency and rule of law” in Latin America, stressing the relationship between the rule of law, democracy, and economic development,
expressing concern that foreign investors are not able to turn to the courts for help).
3. See, e.g., Testimony of Ann Van Dusen, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Policy and Program Coordination, U.S. Agency for International Development: Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. (1999)
available in 1999 WL 20010787 (describing U.S. Agency for International Development’s
funding of rule of law initiatives in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe); FY 98
Foreign Operations Appropriations: Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations of the House
Comm. on Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Lucinda A. Low on behalf of the
American Bar Association) available in 1997 WL 10570218 (describing extensive ABA Global
Rule of Law Projects in the context of the Foreign Operations Appropriations budget; projects
cover Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America); Paula Dobriansky,
America’s Most Rewarding Export, WASH. TIMES, June 10, 1992, at G4 (associate director for
policy and programs, United States Information Agency, describing extensive USIA efforts to
assist other countries in establishing the rule of law); US-China Legal Cooperation Fund Announces China Rule of Law Awards, PR NEWSWIRE, May 23, 2000 (describing private busi-
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groups regularly send lawyers and judges out to developing countries
as missionaries preaching the importance of an independent judiciary, fair and settled substantive rules, and even-handed application of
the law.4 But it behooves us to set our own house in order, not to
ignore problems with our justice system that themselves undermine
international trade and our position as advocates of the rule of law in
the world. We ourselves are less than perfect in this regard and may
in fact be in violation of international agreements because of it.
While many American jury verdicts are reasonable, in cases involving foreign or out-of-state defendants, they can be very large and
bear little relation to the actual injury suffered.5 This is a recognized
problem for American business and is increasingly a problem for foreign businesses too, as a result of greater global trade and investment.6 The U.S. Supreme Court has thus far shown few signs of acting to resolve the problem.7 The U.S. Congress has tried multiple
ness-backed fund to encourage “stronger US-China cooperation in the field of law”).
4. See, e.g., FY 98 Foreign Operations Appropriations: Before the Subcomm. on Foreign
Operations of the House Comm. on Appropriations, supra note 3 (describing ABA’s extensive
funding of visits by American judges and lawyers to other countries to provide advice); Dobriansky, supra note 3, at G4 (describing USIA’s sending several delegations of American judges
to Moscow to conduct workshops for Russian judges, sending legal experts to Kazakhstan, and
a federal judge to Albania); Kenyan System Stifles Rights, U.S. Jurists Say, S.F. CHRON., July
20, 1991, at A10 (describing reactions of a delegation of U.S. jurists to Kenya).
5. Empirical studies of civil damages have concluded that, in effect, there are essentially
two damages systems: a large realm of moderate awards and a smaller one of extraordinarily
high awards. This is especially the case with punitive damages. See, e.g., STEPHEN DANIELS &
JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 231 (1995); Marc Galanter,
Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1135–36 (1996); Michael
Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes With Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 62 (1992) (referring to “a very few abnormally large jury
awards”).
6. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic Analysis,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1999, at 73, 74–75; Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L.
Blaner, Civil Justice Reform in America: A Question of Parity with Our International Rivals,
13 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 1, 1–4 (1992); Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful,
30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 163 & n.270 (1996).
7. In its latest foray into the question of the constitutionality of punitive damages
awards, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), the Supreme Court held a
punitive damages award unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause because it was excessive but provided little guidance to courts on how to judge future cases. See, e.g., Jane Mallor
& Barry S. Roberts, Punitive Damages: On the Path to a Principled Approach?, 50 HASTINGS
L.J. 1001, 1010–14 (1999) (noting ambiguities in the BMW opinion); Leading Cases, Punitive Damages—Grossly Excessive Awards, 110 HARV. L. REV. 145, 145–46 (1996) (noting ambiguities in the BMW opinion). Based on empirical research, scholars have found that the
BMW v. Gore opinion has had no significant effect on damage awards. Theodore Eisenberg &
Martin T. Wells, The Predictability of Punitive Damages Awards in Published Opinions: The Im-
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times to pass tort reform bills, but it has failed.8 Scholarly attention
has focused on these two methods of solving the problem of excessive verdicts. However, where the Supreme Court and Congress have
failed, a new group of international agreements might succeed. This
article will focus on an agreement that may prove especially potent in
reining in verdicts: the North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”). Since other trade agreements are likely to be patterned
on NAFTA, including the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas (“FTAA”),9 it is important to understand NAFTA’s potential impact on the U.S. justice system. Our desire for international
trade is starting to collide with our unusual (by international standards) system of civil justice, and that collision may generate tension
that saps support for international trade agreements.
One of the key features of NAFTA is its provisions for individual
investors to sue foreign nations directly to enforce the agreement’s
guarantees.10 These are known as investor-state provisions and are a
change from the traditional international law system, in which only a
state could bring an action against another state. Through investorstate provisions, “public” international law has become more private.
The United States has long championed investor-state provisions as a
way to prevent countries from expropriating U.S. citizens’ investments, particularly in Latin America. In general, capital-exporting
countries favor investor-state provisions to protect their citizens from
lesser-developed countries’ temptation to confiscate foreign assets.
In addition to this procedural mechanism, NAFTA encompasses
a substantive doctrine that capital-exporting countries have invoked
against less-developed countries: the prohibition of denial of justice.11 Under this international law doctrine, a state is responsible for
injustices committed by its courts as well as by its executive or legislature. Denial-of-justice claims were frequently brought when the
underlying cause was physical harm to or incarceration of individuals;

pact of BMW v. Gore on Punitive Damages Awards, and Forecasting Which Punitive Awards
Will Be Reduced, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 59, 59 (1999).
8. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Should Congress Engage in Tort Reform?, 1 MICH. L. &
POL’Y REV. 121, 136–39 (1996) (discussing various tort reform proposals).
9. The FTAA appears to be moving steadily toward completion in the next few years.
See Rossella Brevetti, Proposal to Accelerate FTAA Talks To Be Discussed at Ministers’ Meeting,
17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1866, 1866 (Dec. 7, 2000).
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.
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most of these situations are now covered by international human
rights law. In civil cases, the main concern has traditionally been fear
that the court system of a developing country will not provide adequate redress for economic harm, such as seizure of assets. Developing countries, particularly in Latin America, and capital-exporting
countries such as the United States have disagreed strongly over the
scope of the denial of justice doctrine. NAFTA firmly embraces the
view of the capital-exporting countries.
While there was a flurry of scholarship on denial-of-justice claims
in the 1930s, with some interest through the early 1960s, there has
been little recently.12 Academic interest in denial of justice questions
has tended to wax and wane according to the frequency of expropriations of foreign investments. There ought to be greater interest
in this doctrine now that international agreements such as NAFTA
have the potential to create liability based on events other than outright seizure of assets and through claims brought by individual investors. This article will help address this gap by examining the extent to which certain American verdicts—awarded by state courts, in
particular—may be judged denials of justice under international law.
It is especially ironic that the U.S. government faces potential liability for American verdicts thanks to a combination of the procedural mechanism of investor-state claims and the substantive doctrine of denial of justice, both championed by the United States to
protect against the misdeeds of other countries. U.S. liability could
be considerable; in certain respects, American verdicts are far out of
step with those of other countries. State courts, especially, are apt to
provide few checks on juries and judges determined to transfer large
amounts of money from aliens to in-state plaintiffs through compensatory and punitive awards.13
There is currently an arbitration under NAFTA, Loewen v.
United States,14 brought by a Canadian individual and corporation
against the United States based on a $500 million verdict in Mississippi state court. This case provides a good example of how the investor-state provisions and the denial of justice doctrine may work
together to create U.S. liability for state court judgments. Suits such

12. See infra notes 89–104.
13. See infra Part IV.B.1.
14. The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States of America, case no. ARB(AF)/98/3
(registered Nov. 19, 1998).
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as these have potential to trouble free trade agreement negotiations
and functioning because they may be seen as interfering with U.S.
sovereignty, including federal-state relations and such tenacious institutions as civil jury trials and punitive damages.
Because of these sovereignty concerns, NAFTA as it currently exists is probably not the best way to address problems with state court
judgments that harm aliens. Several possible strategies present themselves.15 One approach, at the international level, is to return to the
old method of requiring the investor’s country to bring these claims
on the investor’s behalf. But this approach might allow many instances of discrimination against aliens to go uncompensated; often,
nations may decide not to pursue claims for political reasons.
A better approach, at the national level, would help to prevent
violations from occurring in the first place. The Founders, particularly Alexander Hamilton, were aware of the international problems
an unjust decision against a foreigner could cause. Hamilton’s solution, embodied in Article III of the U.S. Constitution, was to allow
foreigners to remove their cases to federal court. The Founders’ concerns about aliens are now more relevant than ever because of the
global economy. Unfortunately, the rule requiring complete diversity
prevents many foreigners from removing their cases to federal court
and subjects them to the full force of local biases in state courts. By
abandoning the complete diversity requirement as to aliens, the
United States could restore Hamilton’s solution and spare international and national strife.
The article begins in Part I by describing the Loewen case as an
example of the challenges a foreign litigant may face in state court
and how suits can be brought against the U.S. government to compensate the foreign investor under NAFTA. Part II outlines the investor-state provisions of NAFTA. It shows how these provisions
originated in fears about expropriation of foreign assets, particularly
in Latin America, but lately have been used to challenge government
actions going beyond traditional expropriation, such as regulatory
takings. Using the investor-state provisions to compensate for denials
of justice in state courts is another means of expanding the scope of
these provisions. Part III demonstrates that claims for denial of justice are well established in international law, and they may include
both claims of procedural unfairness (lack of an impartial tribunal,
15. See infra Part VI.
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etc.) and claims of substantive injustice (a faulty decision on the merits or an excessive award of damages). Traditionally, denial-of-justice
claims were brought by one state against another on behalf of its injured national. Part III also discusses the specific ways in which the
U.S. civil justice system may be said to violate international standards
and produce denials of justice. The most significant factor here, the
article argues, is the use of elected judges and the relationships between these judges and plaintiffs’ lawyers, focusing on the role of judicial campaign contributions.
Claims against the United States for denial of justice could potentially interfere with the right of U.S. states to organize their justice systems as they see fit and also could trouble the relations between the federal and state governments. Part IV outlines these
concerns. Both the general principle of holding governments liable
for decisions of the judicial branch and the specific mechanism of arbitration used under NAFTA pose problems. Ultimately, decisions
against the United States under the investor-state provisions, particularly decisions based on denial of justice, may undermine support for
international trade agreements. Part V addresses possible responses
to these difficulties. It discusses both the international and national
approaches mentioned above and concludes that the national solution of expanding diversity jurisdiction for aliens would best reduce
domestic and international strife.
II. OVERVIEW OF A NAFTA CLAIM UNDER THE INVESTOR-STATE
PROVISIONS
A. The Civil Litigation in State Court
The Loewen case is the sort of verdict that gives observers of the
U.S. legal system pause. The plaintiff in the U.S. court proceedings,
Jeremiah O’Keefe, owns a Mississippi funeral home and insurance
company and sued The Loewen Group, Inc. for breach of contract
in Mississippi state court.16 The Loewen Group is based in Vancouver and is North America’s second-largest funeral home and service
company.17 O’Keefe named as defendants not only The Loewen
16. For a dramatic and detailed account of the proceedings in Mississippi state court,
including profiles of the plaintiff, defendant, and their lawyers, see Jonathan Harr, The Burial,
NEW YORKER, Nov. 1, 1999, at 70.
17. See NAFTA: Canadian Funeral Company Uses NAFTA to Seek Damages for U.S.
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Group, Inc. and its subsidiary Loewen Group International, Inc. (incorporated in Delaware) but also local Mississippi corporations
owned by Loewen Group International. By naming these Mississippi
defendants, O’Keefe prevented Loewen from removing the case to
federal court.18 “The dispute centered on three contracts valued by
O’Keefe at $980,000 and one alleged contract involving a proposed
exchange of two O’Keefe funeral homes, worth about $2.5 million,
for a Loewen insurance firm worth about $4 million.”19 The total
amount involved in the underlying transactions was considerably less
than $10 million. The lead plaintiff’s lawyer was Willie E. Gary, a
flamboyant figure who is a member of the “Million Dollar Verdict
Club” and the “Golden Legal Eagles,” both clubs whose members
refuse cases alleging less than $100 million in damages.20
At the 1995 trial, O’Keefe testified that “if the settlement was
not carried out, he would have to fight for his life . . . against a rich
and powerful international corporation.”21 The plaintiff’s case featured the O’Keefe family’s 130 year history of operating funeral
homes and insurance companies in Mississippi as opposed to
Loewen’s “foreign” base.22 There was considerable testimony to the
effect that O’Keefe, who is white, was not a racist.23 Four prominent
Hinds County figures and Mike Espy, former Agriculture Secretary
and friend of Mr. O’Keefe, testified to that effect. On cross examination, Espy testified about the alleged unfair trade practices of CanaCourt Ruling, 15 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1978 (Nov. 25, 1998). The company has about
13,000 employees and operates 1,100 funeral homes and more than 500 cemeteries in the
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. According to the company, 90% of
Loewen’s revenue comes from the U.S. market. See Robert E. Lutz & Russell C. Trice,
NAFTA at Five and the Loewen Case: Is NAFTA the Blood Relative of Lady Justice or the Angel
of Death for State Sovereignty?, TRANSLEX, Oct. 1999, at 1 n.1.
18. See infra Part VI.B.2.
19. NAFTA: Panel Expected To Be Constituted Soon in Canadian Firm’s $725 Million
NAFTA Claim, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 81 (Jan. 20, 1999) [hereinafter Panel Expected].
20. See Yvonne Samuel, Florida Attorney to Receive State King Award, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Jan. 8, 1998, at B1. Gary’s private jet is named “Wings of Justice.” Id. Recently,
he has become involved in a lawsuit alleging racial discrimination against Coca-Cola, in which
he plans to ask for $1.5 billion in damages. Betsy McKay, Attorneys in Coke Race-Bias Settlement Assail Lawyer Who Filed Separate Suit, WALL ST. J., Jun. 30, 2000, at B8.
21. Lutz & Trice, supra note 17, at 1.
22. See, e.g., Transcript, Jeremiah J. O’Keefe, et al. v. The Loewen Group, Inc., et al.,
No. 91-67-423 (Cir. Ct., 1st Judicial Dist. Hinds County), at 1998, 2000, 2010 (copy on file
with author).
23. See Panel Expected, supra note 19, at 81. The presiding judge and eight of the
twelve jurors were black. Id.
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dian wheat farmers: “The Canadian wheat was underpriced. They
would come in, flood our markets, our people would eat a lot of
pasta, and they would not buy American wheat.”24 Besides issues of
race and national origin, plaintiff’s counsel emphasized Loewen’s
personal wealth. Cross-examination of Ray Loewen (during the liability, not punitive damages, phase) began with an extended discussion, covering three pages of trial transcript, of whether Loewen’s
boat was a yacht.25 Plaintiff’s counsel’s closing argument referred to
O’Keefe’s service in the U.S. armed forces during World War II:
O’Keefe “fought, and some died for the laws of this nation, and
they’re [Loewen] going to put him down for being American.”26
Counsel repeated Espy’s testimony regarding Canadian wheat farmers27 and concluded by drawing an analogy between Loewen’s competition with O’Keefe and the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor.28
The jury awarded $100 million in compensatory damages, of
which $75 million was for emotional distress, and $400 million in
punitive damages for a total of $500 million.29 Shortly after the verdict was handed down, the foreman of the jury (who, interestingly,
was born in Canada but had moved to Mississippi thirty years before30) said that Ray Loewen “was a rich, dumb Canadian politician
who thought he could come down and pull the wool over the eyes
of a good ole Mississippi boy. It didn’t work.”31 In order to appeal,
Mississippi requires posting an appeal bond of 125 percent of the
judgment amount.32 This bond, however, may be reduced or waived
for good cause.33 According to Loewen, the verdict represented between 63 percent and 78 percent of the company’s net worth.34
24. Transcript, supra note 22, at 1101–02.
25. See id. at 5106–08. The following question is representative of the exchange: “Well,
can you land a helicopter on your canoe, boat or yacht, which one? Can’t you land a helicopter
on it?” Id. at 5106.
26. Id. at 5588.
27. See id. at 5587–88.
28. See id. at 5593–94.
29. See Final Judgment, Jeremiah J. O’Keefe, et al. v. The Loewen Group, Inc., et al.,
No. 91-67-423 (Cir. Ct., 1st Judicial Dist. Hinds County) (copy on file with author).
30. Harr, supra note 16, at 91.
31. Nina Bernstein, Brash Funeral Chain Meets Its Match in Old South, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
27, 1996, at A6.
32. See MISS. R. APP. P. 8(a) (1999).
33. See id. at 8(b).
34. See Loewen’s Notice of Claim, Jeremiah J. O’Keefe et al. v. The Loewen Group,
Inc. et al., No. 91-67-423 (Cir. Ct., 1st Judicial Dist. Hinds County), at 42 (copy on file with
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Loewen claims its costs of posting a full appeal would have exceeded
$200 million, which it would not have been able to recover even if it
had won the appeal.35 The Mississippi Supreme Court refused to reduce the appeal bond, and, therefore, O’Keefe would have been able
to levy on Loewen’s assets within a week.36 Loewen settled with
O’Keefe for $175 million.37
B. Claims Under NAFTA Chapter 11
Loewen, already highly leveraged, was not willing to give up. In
November 1998, Loewen filed for arbitration against the United
States alleging violations of the investor-state provisions of
NAFTA.38 These provisions, found in NAFTA Chapter 11, provide a
direct remedy for individual investors from one NAFTA Party against
another NAFTA Party in cases where government actions have interfered with NAFTA guarantees.39 Chapter 11 subchapter A sets out
the substantive guarantees; subchapter B sets out the remedial procedure.
Claims under the investor-state provisions of NAFTA are arbitrated. Under Chapter 11 subchapter B, the individual investors have
the choice of proceeding under one of the following methods of arbitration: (1) before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”); (2) before an ad hoc arbitral body es-

author).
35. See id. at 43–44.
36. Loewen had considerable assets in Mississippi and elsewhere in the United States
that could be levied on. Harr, supra note 16, at 80, 94.
37. Gary reportedly received $69 million in contingency fees from the settlement. Samuel, supra note 20, at B1. The second chair plaintiff’s lawyer in the Loewen case, according to
his testimony in a suit his ex-wife brought for increased child support, received the following
fees from the Loewen settlement: a $2 million cash payment in 1996; 60,000 shares of restricted Loewen stock valued at $24 per share in 1997; and 4% ownership in a noninterestbearing note of $80 million from which he would receive twenty annual payments of $160,000
starting in February 1997. Cavanaugh v. Cavanaugh, No. 97-CA-00553 COA, 1998 Miss.
App. LEXIS 656, at *4 (Miss. App. Aug. 18, 1998). In June 1999, the Loewen Group filed
for bankruptcy protection to reorganize its debt. (The company had other woes; it fended off a
takeover bid and faced additional litigation, including a securities class action.) The company’s
Chairman told shareholders in June that the reorganization could render Loewen’s shares almost completely worthless. Lutz & Trice, supra note 17, at 2 n.3.
38. See The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States of America, case no. ARB(AF)/98/3
(registered Nov. 19, 1998).
39. “NAFTA Party” is the technical term for countries that have joined NAFTA: the
United States, Mexico, and Canada.
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tablished pursuant to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) rules; or (3) before ICSID’s Additional Facility.40 The Additional Facility was established to arbitrate
disputes involving non-ICSID members or their nationals. Loewen
brought its claim before the ICSID’s Additional Facility because, although the United States is an ICSID member, Canada is not.41
Under NAFTA rules, arbitration panels normally consist of three arbitrators: “one . . . appointed by each of the . . . parties and the
third, who [acts as] the presiding arbitrator, appointed by agreement
of the disputing parties.”42 The tribunal for the Loewen case was impaneled on March 17, 1999, and is made up of one arbitrator each
from the United States, Canada, and Australia.43 The tribunal held
its first session in Washington, D.C., on May 18, 1999. The U.S.
government responded to the claim in late February 2000, filing an
objection to the panel’s jurisdiction. According to an associate general counsel of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative speaking
in April 2000, the panel decided to hear jurisdictional issues first,
and so the U.S. government has not yet filed a memorial on the merits.44 Arbitration hearings and filings are generally not available to the
public.45
The actions of the Mississippi courts were alleged to have violated three provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11.46 The first is Article
1102, which requires NAFTA governments to treat investors from
other NAFTA Parties no less favorably than it treats its own inves40. See North America Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1993, art. 1120, 107 Stat. 2057
[hereinafter NAFTA]. For an excellent overview of NAFTA arbitration procedures, see generally 1 Ralph H. Folsom et al., NAFTA Dispute Panels: Structure and Procedures, HANDBOOK
OF NAFTA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT ch. 2 (1998).
41. “Canada is not a party to the case but the Canadian government will get copies of
documents filed in the matter.” Panel Expected, supra note 19, at 81.
42. NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1123.
43. See List of Pending Cases (visited Oct. 25, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org
/icsid/cases/pending.htm>. The arbitrators are: Anthony Mason, president, of Australia; L.
Yves Fortier of Canada, and Abner J. Mikva, former chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, of the United States. See id.
44. See Rossella Brevetti, NAFTA: U.S. Challenges NAFTA Panel’s Jurisdiction in Canadian Funeral Firm’s Chapter 11 Case, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 637 (Apr. 20, 2000)
(reporting remarks of Steven F. Fabry, associate general counsel of the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, to the American Bar Association’s Section of International Law and Practice).
45. “Filings may be available through the Freedom of Information Act, counsel for
Loewen [has noted].” Panel Expected, supra note 19, at 81. Public Citizen has filed a FOIA
request for information about the arbitration. See id.
46. Loewen’s Notice of Claim, supra note 34, at 48–60.
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tors. Article 1102 further specifically provides that a state or province
must provide treatment no less favorable than the most favorable
treatment they give to investors of the country of which it forms a
part. The second provision is Article 1105, which sets out a minimum standard of treatment for NAFTA Parties’ investors. This Article provides that investments by another NAFTA Party’s investors
must be treated “in accordance with international law, including fair
and equitable treatment and full protection and security.” Loewen
alleges the trial court violated this provision “by allowing O’Keefe’s
lawyers to repeatedly elicit irrelevant and highly prejudicial testimony, and to make irrelevant and highly prejudicial comments,
about the nationality, race, and class of the principal parties in the
litigation.”47 Other violations of Article 1105 were the “grossly excessive verdict” and the Mississippi Supreme Court’s application of
the bonding requirement.48 Third, the Mississippi courts were alleged to have violated Article 1110, which prohibits nationalization
or expropriation (or actions “tantamount to nationalization or expropriation”) of investments of NAFTA Parties’ investors. (There is
an exception to this provision, but only for takings done for a public
purpose, on a nondiscriminatory basis, in accordance with due process of law and the principles of international law, and where payment
of fair market compensation is made.49) Loewen claims this provision
was violated in the trial judge’s permission of discriminatory conduct
at trial, the excessive verdict, the denial of a right to appeal, and the
“coerced” settlement.50
Loewen also stresses NAFTA Article 105, which places an obligation on NAFTA Parties with respect to states and provinces. Article 105 provides that “the Parties shall ensure that all necessary
measures are taken in order to give effect to the provisions of this
Agreement, including their observance . . . by state and provincial
governments.” Because of this provision, Loewen argues, the United

47. Id. at 57.
48. Id. at 54, 58.
49. Article 1110 of NAFTA is modeled on the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 (1987), Economic Injury to Nationals of
Other States: “A state is responsible under international law for injury resulting from: (1) a
taking by the state of the property of a national of another state that (a) is not for a public purpose, or (b) is discriminatory, or (c) is not accompanied by provision for just compensation. . . .”
50. Loewen’s Notice of Claim, supra note 34, at 59.
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States government is responsible for Mississippi’s violations of
NAFTA.51 Loewen cites a letter written by Michael Kantor, who was
then U.S. Trade Representative, at the time NAFTA was signed by
the United States. Kantor stated: “Article 105 . . . mean[s] that the
federal government will be held accountable if it cannot secure state
or provincial compliance with NAFTA obligations.”52
To support its claims, Loewen has assembled a formidable legal
team. The former president of the International Court of Justice, Sir
Robert Jennings, declares in an appendix to Loewen’s Notice of
Claim that the jury’s verdict constitutes a clear violation of international law since it was “so bizarrely disproportionate as almost to
defy belief.”53 “Of a $500 million judgment in a case involving property and assets in dispute of only a few million dollars, one might almost say res ipsa loquitur.”54 This verdict was the result, he says, of
the plaintiff’s counsel’s “ruthless and blatant working up of both racial and nationalistic prejudice,” unrestrained.55 Loewen also secured
an affidavit from Richard Neely, the colorful former Chief Justice of
the West Virginia Supreme Court and a member of the Association
of Trial Lawyers of America (“ATLA”). Neely is known for his blunt
opinions on the treatment of out-of-state corporations by state
courts.56 In the Loewen case, Neely says, it is virtually certain that
Loewen was “intentionally subjected to a complete denial of justice
by the Mississippi trial court and the Mississippi Supreme Court” because of its Canadian citizenship.57 Neely says that “even for a plaintiff’s lawyer like me, the case . . . from beginning to end, descends to
the level of a mockery of justice.”58 The claim also includes an October 29, 1998, letter by Mississippi Governor Kirk Fordice to the
NAFTA Dispute Resolution Tribunal, maintaining that the Loewen
verdict “stands as a vivid example of the continuing need for . . . re51. Id. at 61–63.
52. Letter from Michael Kantor to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Subcomm. on Health
and the Env’t. (Sept. 7, 1993), H.R. REP. NO. 103-361(III), at 132 (1993), reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2858, 2862.
53. Opinion of Sir Robert Jennings in The Loewen Group Case, Appendix A of
Loewen’s Notice of Claim, supra note 34, at 13.
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 119–26.
57. Opinion of Richard Neely in The Loewen Group Case, Appendix B of Loewen’s
Notice of Claim, supra note 34, at 17.
58. Id. at 3.
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form.”59 He said that the trial appeared to have been “tainted by
xenophobic rhetoric” and called the amount of the verdict “shocking.”60 He wrote, “[i]t concerns me that Loewen’s status as a Canadian company may have deprived it of fundamental rights that would
otherwise be guaranteed to the citizens of our state.”61
To compensate it for these various violations, Loewen is claiming
a total of $725 million in damages.62 Of this total, $175 million are
to compensate for the amount Loewen claims it was coerced into
paying to settle the case, and $550 million are for reduction in the
value of Raymond Loewen’s shares in the firm that resulted from the
verdict and for harm to his reputation.63
The Loewen filing under NAFTA has not gone unnoticed by
various advocacy groups. Public Citizen and Friends of the Earth
have pointed to the Loewen arbitration as evidence of NAFTA’s infringement on U.S. sovereignty. Public Citizen held a press conference on the Loewen case and has devoted substantial parts of its website to information about it.64 At the press conference, Public Citizen
president Joan Claybrook called the Loewen arbitration “an all-out
attack on democracy. If successful, it would undermine the jury system, which is fundamental to our system of justice.”65 Both Public
Citizen and Friends of the Earth are calling for the renegotiation of
Chapter 11 to prevent such arbitrations in the future.66

59. Letter from Governor Kirk Fordice to the NAFTA Dispute Resolution Tribunal,
Oct. 29, 1998, in Appendix C of Loewen’s Notice of Claim, supra note 34, at 1–2.
60. Id. at 1.
61. Id. at 2.
62. See Loewen’s Notice of Claim, supra note 34, at 67.
63. See id. at 66–67; Panel Expected, supra note 19, at 81.
64. Public Citizen also has a joint website with Friends of the Earth entitled “NAFTA’s
Corporate Lawsuits,” which discusses the Loewen case. See NAFTA’s Corporate Lawsuits (visited Jan. 26, 2000) <http://www.citizen.org/pctrade/nafta/cases/fancy.pdf>.
65. NAFTA: Public Citizen Calls NAFTA Suit Attack on Democracy, Jury System, 15
INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 2007 (Dec. 2, 1998).
66. See NAFTA’s Corporate Lawsuits, supra note 64.
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III. CHANGING USES FOR INVESTOR-STATE PROVISIONS: FROM
REMEDYING TRADITIONAL EXPROPRIATION TO ATTACKING
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
A. Origins of Investor-State Provisions: U.S. Fears of Latin American
Expropriation
The ability of a private party to sue a foreign government directly
is relatively recent in international law. Traditionally, states were the
only actors who had a legal personality in international fora. If a
state’s national were injured by the acts of a foreign government,
only the state itself could bring a claim, acting on its national’s behalf.67 The idea was to protect state sovereignty from attacks by private parties and to manage international disputes through orderly
channels sensitive to larger issues between states.68
This concept of the state alone having a legal personality in international fora began to crumble with the advent of international
arbitration conventions in the 1950s and 60s. Especially important
was the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, which established the
ICSID in 1966.69 That convention provided a venue, rules of arbitration, an administrative counsel, a secretariat, and expertise to allow
arbitrations between investors and foreign states to go forward. Before that time, World Bank staff members and particularly the president of the World Bank had served as mediators or conciliators of in67. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
677–78 (3d ed. 1993) (describing customary international law whereby a state only may assert
a claim against another state on behalf of its national); James H. Carter, Investor-Host State
Investment Dispute Settlement Procedures, in THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT: ITS SCOPE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH AMERICA’S LAWYERS, BUSINESSES
AND POLICYMAKERS § D.I (Claire Reade ed., 1993).
68. This concept of protecting state sovereignty from the incursions of private party
suits lies behind the act of state doctrine, according to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court has
said that, under the act of state doctrine, “‘the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances
by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
powers as between themselves.’” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416
(1963) (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)). This doctrine deals with
national, rather than international fora, but the same motivation to protect sovereignty is evident.
69. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, Mar.18, 1965, art.1, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 1273.
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vestor-state disputes on an ad hoc basis.70 The ICSID was intended
to relieve the World Bank staff and president of this burden and to
promote greater flows of foreign investment.71
The United States has been particularly enthusiastic about investor-state provisions and use of the ICSID. The U.S. government has
signed dozens of Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”), which provide for investor-state disputes to be arbitrated under either ICSID
or UNCITRAL rules.72 The standard investor-state provision for arbitration in these U.S. BITs was the model for the investor-state
provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11 subchapter B.73 The United States
has pushed for these provisions largely because of concerns with foreign expropriation of U.S. investor assets abroad.74 This problem has
plagued U.S. investments for some time, particularly in Latin America. The expropriations by the Cuban government following the
revolution there were keenly felt by some Americans,75 and “Mexico’s nationalization of the oil industry in 1938 is still part of the collective U.S. corporate memory.”76 The main motivation behind
NAFTA Chapter 11 was to protect U.S. and Canadian investments
from seizure by the Mexican government.77 It is therefore especially
ironic that such a provision is now being used to attack a decision of
an American court as a denial of justice.
B. Creative Uses of Chapter 11: Regulatory Takings
NAFTA Chapter 11, like many BITs, has very broad protective
language that would seem to encompass much conduct beyond traditional expropriation. It is now being used to get compensation for

70. See ICSID’s website at <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/main.htm>.
71. See id.
72. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty,
92 AM. J. INT’L L. 621, 632 (1998).
73. See Matthew Nolan & Darin Lippoldt, Obscure NAFTA Clause Empowers Parties:
Investor-Protection Clause Lets Companies Haul Signatories into Arbitration for Violation of
Pact, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 6, 1998, at B8.
74. See Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive
Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 INT’L LAW. 727 (1993).
75. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that
U.S. owners of sugar expropriated by the Cuban government were denied a remedy because of
the act of state doctrine).
76. Nolan & Lippoldt, supra note 73, at B8.
77. Id.
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a wide range of other harms.78 This expansion is stirring up opposition that may ultimately lead to an overhaul of NAFTA or even put
the entire agreement in jeopardy.79 The Loewen case is but one example of the creative use of Chapter 11. The Loewen case so far is
unusual in attacking a judicial decision of a NAFTA Party; more
common are complaints about regulatory takings. To date, U.S.
companies have filed for arbitration involving regulatory takings under Chapter 11 in about half a dozen known cases.80 Most of these
cases are still pending before arbitral boards. These claims would
have little chance of success under domestic U.S. takings law.81 Yet
regulatory takings claims under NAFTA Chapter 11 have led to at
least one significant settlement.
In Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada,82 Virginia-based Ethyl
Corporation achieved a settlement providing for payment of damages and repeal of a regulation. Ethyl was the sole manufacturer of
the gasoline additive MMT,83 used to reduce knocks in engines. The
Canadian parliament became concerned about the possible health effects of MMT and enacted a ban on international and interprovincial trade in the substance. Ethyl filed a claim for arbitration
under NAFTA in April 1997, asking for $250 million for expropriating anticipated profits and damage to its reputation based on parliamentary debate before the ban was imposed. To settle the case, in
July 1998 the Canadian government agreed to lift its ban on trading
the fuel additive, paid Ethyl $10 million, and “issued a public statement that [MMT] posed no health risk.”84

78. See, e.g., David A. Gantz, Potential Conflicts Between Investor Rights and Environmental Regulation Under NAFTA’s Chapter 11, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming
2001), Part III.E (“Context and Process”), at 43–45 (manuscript on file with the George
Washington International Law Review).
79. See infra note 232.
80. The actual number of cases filed for arbitration could be higher. The ICSID and its
Additional Facility report a docket of pending arbitrations, but the UNCITRAL does not. See
List of Pending Cases, supra note 43. In addition, cases could be settled before arbitration is
formally begun.
81. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014–19 (1992);
Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations,
45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1369–71 (1993).
82. See Iris Winston, Fueling the Debate Over MMT in Gasoline, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Dec.
19, 1997.
83. Methylcyclopentadienyl Manganese Tricarbonyl.
84. See Samrat Ganguly, Note, The Investor-State Dispute Mechanism (ISDM) and a Sovereign’s Power to Protect Public Health, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L.113, 152 (1999).
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There is already considerable criticism of the use of the investorstate provisions in NAFTA to compensate regulatory takings, on the
grounds that such use is an unwarranted infringement of national
sovereignty.85 As a result of the Ethyl case and other arbitrations for
regulatory takings filed against it, Canada has expressed displeasure
with the current form of Chapter 11. According to BNA, there are
indications that Canadian officials have asked the United States and
Mexico for discussions to clarify the Chapter 11 guarantees and that
such discussions are underway.86 Various top Canadian trade negotiators have expressed concern about Chapter 11’s ambiguity and
have said that none of the NAFTA parties had originally intended
the provisions to be read so broadly. Some Canadians have said they
hope the filing against the U.S. government in the Loewen case will
help spur the United States to discuss clarifying Chapter 11.87
IV. USING NAFTA TO COMPENSATE FOR A U.S. VERDICT:
DENIALS OF JUSTICE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The broadly-worded guarantees of Chapter 11 give a foreign entity that is situated similarly to Loewen respectable claims that state
courts violated its NAFTA rights. The United States has long argued
that nations should be liable for injustices committed in their courts,
particularly in Latin American countries.88 Now the United States
must deal with the consequences of this doctrine being applied to its
own courts. This Part explores features of the U.S. civil justice system that might be held to violate international law.
As Loewen’s claims indicate, there are at least three provisions of
NAFTA that may be invoked as a result of a judicial decision: (1) the
obligation to treat investors from other NAFTA Parties no less favorably than its own investors (Article 1102), also known as the
“nondiscrimination principle”; (2) the obligation to treat another
NAFTA Party’s investors “in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security”
85. See generally id.
86. See U.S. Awaits Coming of “Millennium Round” of WTO Negotiations, 16 INT’L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 103 (Jan. 20, 1999) (reporting that the Canadian government has indicated displeasure with NAFTA Chapter 11 and in particular the Ethyl Corp. outcome);
NAFTA, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 112 (Jan. 20, 2000) (reporting that NAFTA signatories had held a number of working group meetings to discuss clarification of Chapter 11).
87. See Panel Expected, supra note 19, at 81.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 96–99.
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(Article 1105), known as the “minimum standard of treatment”; and
(3) the obligation not to nationalize or expropriate the investments
of another NAFTA Party’s investors unless this is done for a public
purpose, in a nondiscriminatory way, with due process under
international law, and paying fair market compensation (Article
1110). The discussion that follows will focus on the second of these
claims, the “minimum standard of treatment” required by Article
1105. That minimum standard underlies Article 1110 claims for
expropriation and also has much in common with Article 1102
claims about discriminatory treatment.
A. The Definition of “Denial of Justice”
The minimum standard of treatment for aliens is related to what
is known in international law as “denial of justice.” “Denial of justice” is, however, much easier to state than to define. One prominent jurist has called this doctrine “one of the oldest and one of the
worst elucidated in international law.”89 As background to the discussion that follows, it is important to have some idea of how international law is made. In developed legal systems, there are definite
means of identifying the law, such as reference to the constitution,
statutes, and judicial decisions. Generally speaking, there is a welldefined hierarchy among them. However, the international arena
lacks a hierarchical structure of institutions, and the problem of finding the law is much more complicated. Many accept the list of
sources of international law enumerated in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.90 The Article lists “international conventions” (treaties); “international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law”; “the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”; and “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law” (the latter referring to the works of learned writers).91
89. Charles de Visscher, Le déni de justice en droit international, 52 RECUEIL DES
COURS 369, 369 (1935 II) (translated by author); see also A.O. Adede, A Fresh Look at the
Meaning of the Doctrine of Denial of Justice Under International Law, 14 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L.
73 (1976). For the early history of the concept, see Hans W. Spiegel, Origin and Development
of Denial of Justice, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 63 (1936).
90. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (7th rev. ed. 1997).
91. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1); see also Maurice Mendelson,
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Treaties are of growing importance in international law, but often they themselves refer to established principles of international law
that are drawn from other sources. An example is the “minimum
standard of treatment” in NAFTA Article 1105.92 The second category, customary law, can be found in several sources. These include
the actual practice of states—embodied in, among other things, correspondence with other states and the advice each state receives from
its legal advisers—the decisions of international tribunals, and writings of international lawyers.93 (There is considerable overlap in the
categories listed in Article 38(1).) The third category, general principles of law, may involve principles specific to the international system
or principles of domestic law common to most systems. Issues involving procedure, including denial of justice, tend to draw more
heavily on domestic law principles.94 As for the fourth category, including judicial decisions, in international law there is no formal stare
decisis doctrine as known in common law countries, but international tribunals nearly always take previous decisions into account.95
A cluster of scholarship on denial-of-justice claims appeared in
the 1930s, when expropriations were more common, and the topic
continued to be of interest through the mid-1970s.96 Recently there
has been little, most likely because the numbers of expropriations
have fallen.97 In the earlier part of this century, there was considerable conflict between lesser-developed countries and capitalexporting countries over how the term was to be defined. Americans

The International Court of Justice and the Sources of International Law, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 63–89 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds.,
1996).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 46–48.
93. See MALANCZUK, supra note 90, at 39.
94. See S. Verosta, Denial of Justice, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW, Installment 1, 1007–10 (R. Bernardt ed., 1992).
95. See MALANCZUK, supra note 90, at 51. My colleague Raj Bhala argues that there is
de facto a stare decisis doctrine in certain areas of international law and that this should be recognized de jure. See Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law
(Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 849–52 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (1999).
96. See sources cited supra note 89 and infra note 104.
97. But see scholarship on the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the Libyan expropriations
(especially Pat Norton in the American Journal of International Law), and the ELSI case (especially Sean D. Murphy, The ELSI Case: An Investment Dispute at the International Court of
Justice, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 391 (1991)), which involved other kinds of expropriation.
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and British tended to define the term as broadly as possible, to include all sorts of injuries by whatever branch of government. Latin
American writers, on the other hand, tended to define the term quite
narrowly. In their view, it encompassed only denials of access to the
courts; actual procedures and results could not be questioned. The
Latin American view culminated in the “Calvo doctrine,” after the
Argentinean Carlos Calvo, who formulated it. According to Calvo,
“aliens who establish themselves in a country are certainly entitled to
the same rights of protection as nationals, but they cannot claim any
greater measure of protection.”98 The view was that once access to
the courts had been granted to a foreigner in the same manner in
which it would be granted to a native, there could be no claim of
denial of justice.99
The phrase “denial of justice” has been used in three senses. In
the broadest sense, the phrase “seems to embrace the whole field of
State responsibility, and has been applied to all types of wrongful
conduct on the part of the State toward aliens.”100 This might include conduct by the executive and the legislature as well as the judiciary. In the narrowest sense, the phrase is “limited to refusal of a
State to grant an alien access to its courts or a failure of a court to
pronounce a judgment.”101 There is also an intermediate sense, in
which the phrase “is employed in connection with the improper administration of civil and criminal justice as regards an alien, including
denial of access to courts, inadequate procedures, and unjust decisions.”102 The first special rapporteur, charged with drafting a code
on state responsibility to aliens for the International Law Commission, concluded that the intermediate sense was the most appropriate. It described a “particular . . . wrong for which no other adequate
phrase exists” in the law103 and, presumably, was broad enough to
encompass a variety of wrongdoing by the courts.
It will be seen that this “intermediate sense” of denial of justice
encompasses both procedural and substantive wrongdoing by the

98. 6 M. CHARLES CALVO, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 231 (5th ed. 1896) (translation
by author).
99. See Adede, supra note 89, at 78–79.
100. F.V. GARCÍA-AMADOR ET AL., RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 180 (1974).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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court—both improper procedures and unjust decisions. This dual
definition of denial of justice has become widespread in this century—in scholarly debate, in attempts to codify the law of state responsibility to aliens, and in arbitral decisions. One of the most influential treatises on denial of justice states that “steady international
practice . . . . as well as the overwhelming preponderance of legal authority, recognizes that not only flagrant procedural irregularities
and deficiencies may justify diplomatic complaint, but also gross defects in the substance of the judgment itself.”104
B. Denial of Procedural Justice
Much of what used to fall under the rubric of denials of procedural justice is now part of international human rights law and
mainly concerns criminal cases.105 Nevertheless, there are also procedural obligations to aliens in civil cases. One respected treatise writer
104. ALWYN V. FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR
DENIAL OF JUSTICE 309 (Kraus Reprint Co. 1970) (1938). One of the most prominent cases
to make a distinction between procedural and substantive injustice, and to claim that international law prohibits both, was the Cotesworth and Powell case (Great Britain v. Colombia), in 2
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO
WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 2050 (1898) (the case, however, used the
term “denial of justice” for procedural injustice alone and the term “notorious injustice” for
substantive injustice). Other sources supporting the dual definition of denial of justice include
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 178–82
(1965); F.V. GARCÍA-AMADOR, DRAFT ARTICLES ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE FOR
INJURIES CAUSED IN ITS TERRITORY TO THE PERSON OR PROPERTY OF ALIENS, arts. 5–8; Adede, supra note 89, at 76, 91 (submitted to the International Law Commission, 1957–1961)
(reprinted in GARCÍA-AMADOR ET AL., supra note 100, at 139, 179–99). The Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law is considerably vaguer on the subject of denial of justice. The
Third Restatement simply provides, in section 712, titled “State Responsibility for Economic
Injury to Nationals of Other States,” that
[a] state is responsible under international law for injury resulting from:
(1) a taking by the state of the property of a national of another state that
(a) is not for a public purpose, or
(b) is discriminatory, or
(c) is not accompanied by provision for just compensation; . . . or
....
(3) other arbitrary or discriminatory acts or omissions by the state that impair property or other economic interests of a national of another state.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 (1987).
Comments to the Restatement briefly note that there is a relationship between economic injury
and denial of justice and mention the requirement in international law that an “impartial determination” be made in the case of a taking. Id. cmt. j.
105. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 711 cmt. a (1987).
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observes that “[i]n a general way, the conduct of a trial with palpable
injustice or in violation of the settled forms of law or of those rules
for the maintenance of justice which are sanctioned by international
law warrants diplomatic interposition.”106 These rules include, for example, the obligations to provide an alien access to the courts; to refrain from judicial action without giving an alien a hearing and time
to prepare a defense; to allow an alien to produce evidence or to
summon important witnesses; and to resolve the case with reasonable
dispatch.107 To be a violation of international law, a procedural deficiency must have “prejudiced materially the alien’s defense” or

claim.108
1. Partiality of state judges and juries
Especially significant regarding claims about American judgments
are two internationally-recognized procedural rights: the right to an
impartial tribunal109 and to freedom from unfair discrimination
against the alien because of alienage.110 (Note the close relationship
between the latter aspect of denial of procedural justice and the nondiscrimination principle under NAFTA Article 1102.) The decisions
of international tribunals concerning the right to an impartial court
have tended to focus on executive pressure on the judiciary,111 but
106. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 338
(1922); see also Harvard Research in International Law, The Law of Responsibility of States for
Damage Done in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, Article 9, 23 AM. J.
INT’L L. 133 (1929) (denial of justice includes “gross deficiency in the administration of judicial or remedial process”).
107. See GARCÍA-AMADOR, supra note 104, art. 7; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 181 (1965); FREEMAN, supra note 104, at
267–68.
108. FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 269.
109. See Wheelock case, 4 JOHN BASSET MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 769
(1906); GARCÍA-AMADOR, supra note 104, art. 7 (requirement of an “independent tribunal”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 181(a)
(1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712
cmt. j (1987); Fabiani case, 5 JOHN BASSET MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 4878
(1903).
110. See FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 268–69.
111. See The R.E. Brown claim (United States v. Great Britain 1923), NIELSON’S
REPORT 163, 198 (1926); Fabiani case, supra note 109, at 4877, 4882, 4901; Idler v. Venezuela (United States v. Venezuela 1885), 4 JOHN BASSET MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF
THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY
3491, 3516 (1898).
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there is no logical reason why a denial-of-justice claim might not also
be based on partiality toward a litigant in the absence of executive
pressure, particularly if that partiality is due to financial incentives. It
could be argued that some American state court judges, such as the
Mississippi trial judge and appellate judges in the Loewen case, are
not impartial but rather favor the plaintiff and (perhaps more significantly) the plaintiff’s lawyer for reasons connected with judicial elections and campaign financing.112
The problem of bias is not the same in all American courts; the
incentives of federal and state judges are somewhat different. There
is a large literature on the relative merits of federal and state
courts.113 These scholars are addressing the question of whether state
courts are capable of adequately enforcing federal rights and of deciding diversity cases.114 Many writers have concluded that state
judges are quite capable of handling these cases; a sizable contingent
has argued the opposite.115 However, scholars on both sides employ
mostly abstract arguments and do not explore in detail the pressures
on state judges created by processes such as judicial elections. If they
discuss judicial elections at all, they tend do so at an abstract level.
But the specific forces in judicial election campaigns that operate on
the ground are crucial to understanding the incentives of state
judges.116 This section explores these incentives and the impact they

112. Interestingly, Loewen did not make this argument in its Notice of Claim.
113. The debate was given a great boost by an article written by Burt Neuborne in the
late 1970s. See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
114. The debate over diversity jurisdiction is discussed in more detail infra Part VI.B.
115. There is a good summary of the literature in a recent article by Brett Gerry. See Brett
Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State and Lower Federal
Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 233, 245–52 (1999).
116. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, The Meaning of Federalism, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1365,
1376 (1997) (briefly noting that judicial elections may make it difficult for judges to take a
countermajoritarian position; in symposium on Fear and Federalism); Judith Resnik, Trial as
Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924,
971, 1014 (2000) (briefly noting that judicial elections may make it difficult for judges to take
a countermajoritarian position). Two notable exceptions are Hans A. Linde, The Judge as Political Candidate, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (1992); Brittain Shaw McInnis, Comment, The
$75,000.01 Question: What Is the Value of Injunctive Relief?, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013,
1024–30 (1998). Also, the death penalty literature has spawned interest in judicial elections.
See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Patrick K. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759 (1995);
Norman Redlich et. al., Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due Process
Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 280–98 (1994).

253

4LET-FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/22/01 8:19 PM

[2001

could have on U.S. liability under international law.
The daily practice of many lawyers indicates that local bias is a
problem in certain areas. Empirical studies surveying lawyers confirm
anecdotal evidence.117 One study found that over fifty percent of defense lawyers reported bias against out-of-staters in their state cases.
Over a quarter of plaintiffs’ lawyers admitted this bias.118 Lawyers for
out-of-state defendants readily acknowledge that suits brought in
certain areas of particular states command a “settlement premium”
because of the native bias of judges and juries in these areas.119 To
collect this premium or a higher verdict, plaintiffs’ lawyers take
elaborate care to lay venue in one of these areas. The plaintiffs’ bar
also acknowledges that it often prefers to bring claims in state rather
than federal court. Willie Gary himself, the plaintiffs’ lawyer in the
Loewen case, has said he generally brings his cases in state court and
prefers that venue; he vigorously tries to defeat defendants’ efforts to
remove cases to federal court.120
A few elected state judges have been remarkably candid about
the pressures they face. Formerly chief justice of the West Virginia
117. See Kristin Bumiller, Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases: Analysis of a Survey and Implications for Reform, 15 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 749, 761–62 (1981) (finding that local bias was a
significant factor in rural districts).
118. See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 409, 411 (1992) (finding
bias especially pronounced in southern states).
119. This point about settlement premiums is widely acknowledged in the literature
aimed at practitioners but not so much discussed in academic literature. See, e.g., Kevin J.
Conway et al., Evaluation of a Premises Liability Case for Purposes of Settlement or Trial, Illinois
Institute for Continuing Legal Education, Premises Liability (Main Handbook) § 10.8 (noting
that venue is an important consideration in evaluating a case for settlement; history of settlements and verdicts in various possible venues should be carefully researched); Susan M. Karten,
Evaluation of a Plaintiff’s Case from the Plaintiff’s Perspective, 613 PRAC. L. INST. 7, 9 (1999)
(noting that venue is an important consideration in evaluating a case for settlement); Anthony
Scirica et al., Debate: Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 577, 585–86 (1997) (remarks of Thomas Gottschalk, general counsel of General Motors: “Settlement costs are driven
up by the threat of punitive damages awarded by juries sitting in these pro-plaintiff venues.”);
Beth Shapiro, Evaluation of a Defendant’s Case from a Defendant’s Perspective, 613 PRAC. L.
INST. 15, 19 (1999) (noting that venue is an important consideration in evaluating a case for
settlement).
120. “Mr. Gary said he prefers state courts and no wonder: With their local judges and
juries, a state courtroom can be more familiar ground for lawyers used to pursuing compensation for injured workers or other similar plaintiffs. And it is decidedly unfriendly terrain for a
large corporation.” McKay, supra note 20, at B1 (emphasis added); see also Coca-Cola Files to
Have Second Race-Bias Suit Moved to Federal Court, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2000, at B7 (describing Coca-Cola’s efforts to remove a $1.5 billion suit filed by Willie Gary to federal court
and Mr. Gary’s intention to fight removal).
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Supreme Court of Appeals and currently a plaintiffs’ lawyer, Richard
Neely—who gave an affidavit for Loewen submitted with its notice
of claim—wrote several books while he was still a judge that described the incentives of state judges faced with out-of-state defendants. Based on many years’ experience as a state elected judge and
on discussions with numerous elected judges from other states, he
described how elected judges depend on local support to win and
keep a seat on the bench. Neely put it this way:
As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state
companies to injured in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so.
Not only is my sleep enhanced when I give someone else’s money
away, but so is my job security, because the in-state plaintiffs, their
families, and their friends will reelect me.121

While he was a judge, Neely was rather careful in his books to
avoid the topic of campaign contributions by lawyers. His Loewen
affidavit, written since he has become a plaintiffs’ lawyer, is more explicit on the subject. (Of course, Neely most likely did not write the
affidavit for free.) Neely said, because of his experience and numerous discussions over the years with elected judges from other states,
that the judicial campaign contributions of plaintiffs’ lawyers are
typically generous. “[T]he lawyers who regularly represent plaintiffs
in personal injury, class action and toxic tort cases contribute handsomely to judicial campaigns.”122 This is so because contingency fees
give plaintiffs’ lawyers a direct personal stake in the outcome of trials.
“A judge can allow a plaintiffs’ lawyer to retire early in life on a
handsome income with one discretionary ruling! When multi-million
dollar judgments are involved, a judge’s decision not to set aside a

121. RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: HOW BUSINESS CAN BE
RESCUED FROM THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 4 (1988).
Obviously, in any elected system there is a strong temptation to decide cases in favor
of the local folks who vote, rather than in favor of the out-of-state folks who do not.
State judicial races (particularly at the appellate level where elections are statewide)
are increasingly becoming high-profile, high-cost, media events. When this occurs,
judges must raise money from somebody. Unfortunately, it is a rare judge who is so
well loved that he can raise money from everyone in an evenhanded way. In fact,
well-loved judges can’t raise money from anyone at all. Litigants don’t want judges
who will be intelligent and fair; litigants want judges who will decide cases their way.
See id. at 24.
122. Neely Opinion, supra note 57, at 5.
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punitive damage award may make a plaintiff’s lawyer millions of dollars after taxes.”123
Defense lawyers, in contrast, are usually paid by some method
that is independent of the outcome of a case. Consequently, they
have less of a personal stake in currying favor with judges. “Although
the defense bar can put together numerous modest and reluctant
contributions, the plaintiffs’ bar will cheerfully provide large individual contributions to their friends on the bench.”124 In a state like
Mississippi that has officially nonpartisan elections, campaign contributions, ironically, are especially important. Candidates cannot rely
for support on party affiliation but must become known by spending
a great deal of money.125 Local businesses can somewhat counteract
the plaintiffs’ bar’s contributions because they too contribute to judicial campaigns and have a certain presence in the community. But
out-of-state defendants are relatively defenseless. Neither they nor
their lawyers contribute substantial sums, nor do they typically employ many people in the local community.126 In addition to the incentives of elected judges, juries in certain areas have strong populist
and local biases.127 The result is large verdicts in favor of in-state
plaintiffs against out-of-state defendants.128 Other sources, examining
the effects of contributions on judicial campaigns in Texas, Alabama,
and Philadelphia, corroborate Neely’s account.129

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 4. There is no conflict between this conclusion and the Helland and Tabarrok studies; Helland and Tabarrok lumped together all forms of judicial selection that did not
involve partisan elections, including merit plan appointments and retention elections.
126. See id. at 5–6; NEELY, supra note 121, at 45 (“When all litigants live, vote, hire
workers, and pay taxes in the same jurisdiction, the tension between firm rules and necessary
flexibility can be kept within reasonable bounds. . . . In-state defendants are often protected by
local juries, but out-of-state defendants have nothing to rely upon but a firm set of legal
rules.”).
127. See Neely Opinion, supra note 57, at 4 (“The populist disposition of juries in many
Mississippi judicial districts makes Mississippi an attractive venue for high-stakes tort litigation . . . .”).
128. See NEELY, supra note 121, at 15, 24–17, 45.
129. See, e.g., WINTHROP E. JOHNSON, COURTING VOTES IN ALABAMA (1999) (describing how the 1994 campaign for seats on the Alabama Supreme Court became a battle between
plaintiffs’ lawyers and business interests); Pamela Willis Baschab, Putting the Cash Cow Out to
Pasture: A Call to Arms for Campaign Finance Reform in the Alabama Judiciary, 30 CUMB. L.
REV. 11, 17–18 (2000); Congress, Judicial Conference Mull Changes to Class Action, Mass Tort
Rules, 67 U.S.L.W. 2723, 2723 (June 8, 1999) (describing views that “[s]tate courts are the
forum of choice for plaintiffs’ attorneys . . . because they can capitalize on the political good-
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Empirical work covering a broader geographical range—the entire United States—also corroborates Neely’s account. Until recently, empirical work on jury awards did not focus on the factors of
in-state plaintiffs and out-of-state defendants, nor on judicial elections.130 Recent studies by Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok
will with their local elected judges.”). Several Texas Supreme Court justices accepted campaign
contributions of nearly $400 thousand from lawyers representing Pennzoil and Texaco during
their famous $11 billion lawsuit. Some of the justices who accepted contributions were not
even up for reelection. Sheila Kaplan, Justice for Sale, COMMON CAUSE MAG., May/June
1987, at 29–32. In that case, in-state Pennzoil won a massive judgment against New Yorkbased Texaco, and the Texas Supreme Court refused to reduce the appeal bond, effectively
denying Texaco an appeal. The Dallas Morning News described how judges often heard cases
argued by major contributors and even key fundraisers; lawyers frequently contributed money
to a judge’s campaign just days before their cases were due to be heard by that judge. See Mark
Edgar & Steve McGonigle, Judges Routinely Hear Contributors’ Cases, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Mar. 22, 1987, at A1. A survey, which was supervised by the Texas Supreme Court and
to which 51% of Texas judges responded, indicated that 48% of judges “considered campaign
donations to be ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ influential” in affecting judges’ decisions. Osler McCarthy,
Campaign Gifts Sway Judges, 48% Say in Poll, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, June 10, 1999, at B1.
A two-year study of Philadelphia’s municipal and common pleas courts found that attorneys’
judicial campaign contributions were linked to favorable decisions. H.G. Bissinger & Daniel R.
Biddle, Politics and Private Dealings Beset the City’s Justice System, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Jan. 26, 1986; see also HARRY P. STUMPF & JOHN H. CULVER, THE POLITICS OF STATE
COURTS 43–45 (1992); Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, L. & COMTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 75, 105–06; Roy A.
Schotland, Elective Judges’ Campaign Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes the Emperor’s Clothes
of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57 (1985).
130. Much empirical work has tended to focus on overall rates of punitive damages, with
many authors arguing that punitive damages are neither as frequent nor as high as the popular
view. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 5; Rustad, supra note 5; Theodore Eisenberg et al., The
Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 623–24 (1997); ERIK MOLLER,
RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985, xviii
(1996). Others are concerned about the effects of punitive awards in certain areas of substantive law and about the unpredictability of punitive awards. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Cost of
Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285
(1988); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on Cognition and
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2078–79 (1988); ERIC MOLLER ET AL., RAND
INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN FINANCIAL INJURY JURY VERDICTS 22
(1997).
Previous empirical work did tend to show that mean jury awards in most categories
of cases are vastly higher than median awards. In one study, which drew from a sample of the
nation’s 75 largest counties in 1992, the median jury verdict (for all categories, not just tort)
was $50,000, while the mean was $735,000. See Galanter, supra note 5, at 1133–35; see also
David Luban, A Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359, 361 (1998)
(summarizing studies). This suggests that there are in effect two damage systems in the country; a small world of very high damage awards and a larger one of lesser awards. It could be
argued that drawing samples from the nation’s largest counties may underestimate jury verdicts, since some of the largest awards will probably come from rural areas where county population is low and populist feeling is strong. Of course, the statistics on jury awards are probably
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show that where judges are elected in partisan contests the average
tort award in a case involving an in-state plaintiff and an out-of-state
defendant is 42% higher than in states that do not use partisan judicial elections.131 The studies attempted to correct for differences in
state law by examining diversity jurisdiction cases in federal court.
The authors calculate that two-thirds of the 42% difference is due to
bias against out-of-state defendants and the rest to generally higher
awards against businesses in states that use partisan judicial election.132 In explaining their findings, Helland and Tabarrok point to
the likely powerful influence of trial lawyer donations to judicial
campaigns.133 The Texas Court of Appeals has stated, in a case in
which billions of dollars were awarded against an out-of-state corporation, that “[i]t is not surprising that attorneys are the principal
source of contributions in a judicial election,” and that “[a] candidate for the bench who relies solely on contributions from
nonlawyers must reconcile himself to staging a campaign on something less than a shoestring.”134 In response to the out-of-state defendant’s argument that Texas judges who received campaign contributions from the plaintiff’s lawyers should have recused
themselves, that court stated: “If a judge cannot sit on a case in
which a contributing lawyer is involved as counsel, judges who have
been elected would have to recuse themselves in perhaps a majority
of the cases filed in their courts.”135
Various rulings by the elected trial judge in the Loewen case suggest that the judge was not impartial and may well have been affected by the dynamic explained above. The judge did not attempt
to control plaintiff’s lawyer Mr. Gary in his numerous references to
misleading as to what is actually happening in the legal system because the pressure to settle
certain cases is immense; most of the most pro-plaintiff cases presumably never go to a jury.
This would probably be especially true where the plaintiff is an in-state individual, the defendant an out-of-state corporation, the venue is known for populist juries, and the judges are
elected.
131. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort
Awards, Independent Institute Working Paper #1 (visited Feb. 16, 2001) <http://www.independent.org/tii/WorkingPapers/ElectoralInstitutions.pdf> [hereinafter Electoral Institutions];
see also Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort
Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157, 177–83 (1999) [hereinafter Court Politics].
132. Helland & Tabarrok, Electoral Institutions, supra note 131, at 28–29.
133. Id. at 6-7; Helland & Tabarok, Court Politics, supra note 131, at 158–61.
134. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W. 2d 768, 843 (Tex. App. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1987).
135. Id.
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race, wealth, and Canadian citizenship, despite repeated objections
by defense counsel. Indeed, during a bench conference, the judge
suggested that references to race were fair game,136 although race
had nothing to do with the issues in the case and both the parties
were white. The trial judge also apparently did not consider
Loewen’s motion to reduce excessive punitive damages before he entered judgment, which was arguably required under the Due Process
standards set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip.137 Even apart from the U.S. Supreme
Court’s standards, basic fairness or the appearance of propriety
would have suggested a hearing on the issue of reduction of punitive
damages in a case of Loewen’s magnitude.
Perhaps most telling was the trial court’s handling of compensatory damages. After their initial deliberations, the jurors came in with
a verdict of $260 million. A note from the foreman explained that
they intended $100 million in compensatory damages and $160 million in punitive damages.138 At that point, the judge said that the
trial had to be bifurcated between the compensatory and punitive
damages phases, as had been agreed before trial but had not been reflected in his instructions.139 The judge then, on the basis of the
foreman’s note and overruling Loewen’s motion that the jury be
polled, reformed the jury verdict to consist of $100 million in compensatory damages.140 The punitive damages phase then began. The
plaintiffs, in their complaint, had asked for $26 million in compensatory damages.141 Mississippi rules provide that “final judgment shall
not be entered for a monetary amount greater than that demanded
in the pleadings or amended pleadings,”142 so the judge actually reformed the jury verdict to an amount inconsistent with Mississippi
law.
Although hard data are lacking, adding a defendant’s foreign nationality to the mix would likely exacerbate the usual problems with

136. See Transcript, supra note 22, at 3595–97.
137. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
138. See Transcript, supra note 22, at 5739.
139. See id. at 5752–53.
140. See id. at 5753.
141. See Third Amended and Supplemental Complaint, Jeremiah J. O’Keefe, et al. v. The
Loewen Group, Inc., et al., No. 91-67-423 (Cir. Ct., 1st Judicial Dist. Hinds County), at 79–
82.
142. MISS. R. OF CIV. P. 54(c) (1999).
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out-of-state defendants.143 (It should be noted that under the
NAFTA minimum treatment standard there is no precondition for
recovery that a foreign defendant be treated worse than a U.S. one.
If the tribunal is impermissibly partial, it does not matter whether it
is more partial in a case involving an alien or not.)144 Plaintiffs’ lawyers would have an even easier target, being able to play on nationalist as well as local prejudices.
2. Efforts by counsel to stir up prejudice
Indeed, the Loewen case and several others suggest plaintiffs’
lawyers take full advantage of the additional opportunities presented
by a foreign defendant.145 The Mississippi jury may well have been
moved by what appear to have been plaintiff’s counsel’s frequent references to Loewen’s Canadian connections as well as racial and class
matters. In this area, as in others, the United States has brought
claims against Latin American countries for similar problems in their
courts. In several international arbitrations, inflammatory and prejudicial remarks at trial about defendant’s citizenship were held to have
violated international law. For instance, the Cuban trial of an American was held to have violated international law in part because it was
conducted with “long political harangues” that were irrelevant and
prejudicial.146 A Panamanian trial was also found to have violated in143. See Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction Over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT’L
L. 1, 39–40 (1996). Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg have done an empirical study
suggesting that xenophobia is not “rampant in American courts.” Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Commentary, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120,
1121 (1996). On the contrary, they find that foreign plaintiffs and defendants win substantially
more often than domestic litigants. Id. However, their data comes exclusively from federal civil
cases and therefore says nothing about possible bias in state court. This data indicating lack of
bias in federal court does suggest that removing state cases would be beneficial.
144. The minimum standard of treatment under NAFTA Article 1105 is independent of
the requirement of equal treatment under Article 1102. See supra text accompanying notes 46–
48.
145. See, e.g., Haryanto v. Saeed, 860 S.W.2d 913, 927–28 (Tex. App. 1993) (Robertson, J., dissenting) (quoting closing argument playing on nativist themes); Brits Discover North
Carolina, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1997, at A18 ($600 million verdict awarded against British
company in Meineke muffler franchise case; jurors were told that the British defendant is a
“foreign company preoccupied with one thing: Money,” and the jurors needed to “send a
message to foreign companies”).
146. In the Matter of Jennie M. Fuller (United States v. Cuba), 1971 FOREIGN CLAIMS
SETTLEMENT COMMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 53, 58–
59. See also 8 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 720 (1967).
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ternational law because the Panamanian government “denounced”
the United States during the trial and “improperly went out of [its]
way to excite hostility” against the American defendant.147 In that
case, the United States-Panama Claims Commission concluded that
the trial had been influenced by “strong local sentiment”:148
The Commission cannot avoid the conclusion . . . that the claimant’s conviction was unconsciously influenced by strong popular
feeling . . . . The unavoidable susceptibility of local judges to local
sentiment is a matter of common knowledge. One of the primary
purposes of international arbitration is to avoid just such susceptibility, and to remedy its consequences.”149

C. Denial of Substantive Justice
1. Unjust decisions
Foreigners such as Loewen also may bring claims based on denial
of substantive justice. This is not an easy standard to meet. International law sources agree that mere error in a decision is not enough
to constitute a denial of substantive justice. Gross defects in the substance of the judgment must exist.150 Most scholars and arbitral panels have taken a position similar to that of the British government in
the R.E. Brown claim:
Even if the Honorable Arbitrators may think that if they had been
sitting as members of the High Court of the South African Republic . . . they would have arrived at a different decision, that is not
sufficient to constitute a denial of justice entitling an International
Tribunal to award compensation. A decision does not constitute a
denial of justice unless it is so obviously wrong and unjust that no
court could honestly have arrived at such a conclusion.151

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Solomon v. Panama (United States v. Panama), 6 R.I.A.A. 370, 373 (1933).
Id.
Id. at 479–81.
See FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 319.
Answer of the British Government in the R.E. Brown Claim, quoted in NIELSEN’S
REPORT 252 (1926). See, e.g., The Texas Company Claim, Decision 32-B, AMERICAN
MEXICAN CLAIMS REPORT, 142, 143 (1948) (“palpable injustice in the administration of law”
violates international law); BORCHARD, supra note 106, at 340; Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 106 (“manifestly unjust judgment” violates international law); Adede,
supra note 89, at 91.
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This standard in effect uses the substantive injustice as indirect
evidence of partiality or corruption in the tribunal. This limitation
would seem to be necessary to prevent undue interference with a nation’s sovereignty, discussed in more detail below.
The United States has repeatedly endorsed the view that denials
of justice include manifestly unjust decisions. In the Denham Claim
against Panama, the United States argued that “a nation is responsible for the manifestly unjust decisions of its courts.”152 Earlier in U.S.
history, the U.S. Secretary of State wrote that judicial decisions violate international law “when palpable injustice had been done, or a
manifest violation had been committed of the rules and forms of
proceeding.”153 Alexander Hamilton also seems to have had this understanding of international law.154
The United States has benefited from this view of international
law in several arbitrations, once again particularly those involving
Latin American countries. For example, in the Rihani Claim
(United States v. Mexico), an international arbitral panel held that a
“clear and notorious injustice” violates international law.155 Therefore, an international arbitral panel may “put aside a national decision presented before it” and “scrutinize its grounds of fact and
law.”156 In that case, an international commission reviewed a decision
by the Mexican Supreme Court in a civil case and found it to be
“such a gross and wrongful error as to constitute a denial of justice.”157 In Bronner v. Mexico (United States v. Mexico), an international umpire awarded compensation to a claimant whose goods had
been confiscated by Mexican customs authorities.158 A Mexican court
had decided that the confiscation was allowable, but the umpire
found that the decision was “so unfair as to amount to a denial of

152. Denham Claim (United States v. Panama 1933), HUNT’S REPORT 491, 506
(1934).
153. Letter from Mr. Forsyth, Secretary of State, to Mr. Welsh, Mar. 14, 1835, in 6
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 696 (1906).
154. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 1, at 476–77.
155. Rihani Claim, Decision 27-C, AMERICAN MEXICAN CLAIMS REPORT 254, 257
(1948).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Bronner v. Mexico (United States v. Mexico 1874), 3 JOHN BASSETT MOORE,
HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED
STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 3134 (1898).
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justice.”159
A NAFTA tribunal has actually addressed allegations that the
Mexican courts denied justice to U.S. investors in Azinian v. United
Mexican States.160 In that case, a unanimous ICSID Additional Facility panel discussed the possibility of challenging a court’s decision as
a violation of NAFTA. The panel’s consideration of the subject was
not central to the decision, since the claimant had not directly alleged such a violation. But the panel addressed the issue because it
did not want to be perceived as closing off a claim because of improper pleading.161 While NAFTA arbitration decisions do not have
formal precedential value as in a common law system, the decision of
such a panel is some indication of the approach other panels might
take.
In Azinian, a group of American investors formed a Californiabased company called Desechos Solidos de Naucalpan
(“DESONA”). The company bid on the management of a solidwaste landfill in Naucalpan de Juarez, Mexico. After spending $3
million on bidding and negotiation, the company entered into a fifteen-year contract with the municipality. Shortly afterward, the municipality nullified the agreement. The principals of DESONA filed a
claim against the Mexican government under NAFTA, alleging
breaches of NAFTA Articles 1105 (minimum standard of treatment
for foreign investors: compliance with international law) and 1110
(unlawful expropriation) and seeking over $17 million in damages.162
The Mexican government contended that nullification of the agreement was justified because the contract was invalid from the start
under Mexican law governing public service contracts. (The contract
was by its terms subject to Mexican law and to the jurisdiction of
Mexican courts.) DESONA brought claims against the municipality
in Mexican courts. After testing by three court levels, the Mexican
courts declared that the municipality was justified in nullifying the
contract for invalidity.
159. Id.; see also the Burt Case (United States v. Great Britain 1923), NIELSEN’S REPORT
588, 596–97 (1926) (international tribunal held the result of a property adjudication by the
Fiji Islands’ Board of Land Commissioners to be unjust and ordered that the claimant receive
just compensation).
160. ICSID AF No. ARB(AF)/97/2 (ICSID-AF Arbitral Trib. 1999) (visited Feb. 16,
2001) <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/robert_award.pdf> [hereinafter Azinian].
161. See Azinian, para. 101.
162. The arbitration panel consisted of Benjamin R. Civiletti, former Attorney General of
the United States; Claus von Wobeser of Mexico; and Jan Paulsson of France, who presided.
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The panel was at pains to emphasize it was not reviewing the
Mexican court decisions as if it had plenary appellate jurisdiction. It
insisted the DESONA claimants must show “either a denial of justice, or a pretence [sic] of form to achieve an internationally unlawful
end.”163 The award said denial of justice occurs if courts “refuse to
entertain a suit, if they subject it to undue delay, or if they administer
justice in a seriously inadequate way”164 or if they engage in a “clear
and malicious misapplication of the law.”165 (The latter, the panel
noted, would seem to overlap with the notion of “pretence of form”
masking a violation of international law.)166
The Azinian panel concluded that the findings of the Mexican
courts could not possibly be considered arbitrary, let alone malicious.
As an example, the panel examined one of the twenty-seven irregularities upheld by the Mexican courts as a cause for nullifying the
contract: that the municipality was misled about DESONA’s ability
to perform the contract. Examining the record in some detail, the
panel found ample evidence of material misrepresentations by
DESONA before the contract was signed. The panel determined that
claimants had failed to make the necessary showing that “the evidence for this finding was so insubstantial, or so bereft of a basis in
law, that the judgments were in effect arbitrary or malicious.”167
2. Excessive damages
An important problem with some American civil verdicts is the
huge amount of damages awarded, especially punitive damages. The
Loewen case serves as an example. An award of excessive damages
could be a denial of substantive justice under international law. This
conclusion is reached by analogy to the international law approach to
criminal cases: courts are said to violate international law when they
impose unreasonably harsh sentences on aliens.168 Citing these prin-

163. Azinian, para. 99.
164. Azinian, para.102. This definition was taken from the Harvard study.
165. Azinian, para. 103.
166. Azinian, para. 103.
167. Azinian, para. 105.
168. See, e.g., Bonhomme Case, 18 BRIT. AND FOR. STATE PAPERS 341–440 (1831); Dyches Claim (United States v. Mexico), OPINIONS OF THE COMMISSIONERS 193, 197 (1929);
Quintanilla Claim (Mexico v. United States 1926), OPINIONS OF THE COMMISSIONERS 136,
138 (1927); Solomon v. Panama, 6 R.I.A.A. 370, 479–81 (1933); FREEMAN, supra note 104,
at 348–51; 8 WHITEMAN, supra note 146, at 348–49 (claimant, who had been arrested for
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ciples, the U.S. government has taken the position that a judgment
in a civil case that was disproportionate to the underlying breach of
legal duty is a denial of justice under international law.169 Punitive
damages, in particular, are suspect under international law. Most
countries do not recognize punitive damages at all.170 Those that do
allow punitive damages in some circumstances are concerned about
the size of awards in the United States.171 There is also concern
about large awards for emotional distress or pain and suffering.172
These differences in treatment of damages between the United States
and other justice systems have been a major stumbling block to the
development of a Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments. Other countries are frightened at the prospect of being required to enforce large U.S. punitive and compensatory damages, while the United States considers these to be
important.173 But international law “may be ascertained . . . by the
general usage and practice of nations,”174 and, regarding these issues,
breach of public decency in company with Portuguese students, was sentenced to be publicly
whipped and banished, unlike Portuguese companions).
169. See Denham Claim (United States v. Panama 1933), HUNT’S REPORT 491, 506
(1934).
170. See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Punitive Damages and the Recognition of Judgments, 43
NETH. INT’L. L. REV. 143, 165, 168 n.150 (1996); Cortese & Blaner, supra note 6, at 152;
Takeshi Kojima, Cooperation in International Procedural Conflicts: Prospects and Benefits, 57
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 64 (1994).
171. See, e.g., RICHARD H. KREINDLER & JUDITH L. HOLDSWORTH, TRANSNATIONAL
LITIGATION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, at CAN-82 (1997) (Canada would not enforce
“[a]wards of punitive damages on the scale seen in some American jurisdictions”). Even the
U.S. Supreme Court has said that punitive damages must be proportionate to the harm done.
See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568, 574–75 (1996) (ruling that
punitive damages of 500 times compensatory damages awarded in Alabama trial were so
“grossly excessive” as to violate Fourteenth Amendment).
172. See, e.g., Baird v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 491 F. Supp. 1129, 1149 (N.D. Tex.
1980) (“However similar the laws of Texas and Canada may be with regard to compensatory
damages, they are widely divergent in the areas of compensation for pain and suffering.”); Re
the Enforcement of a U.S. Judgment, 3 INT’L LITIG. PROC. 430, 437–38 (1992) (German
court refuses to recognize U.S. award for pain and suffering). See also the Warsaw Convention,
prohibiting pain and suffering awards in airplane crash cases.
173. See Paul R. Beaumont, A United Kingdom Perspective on the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 75, 109 (1998) (pointing out that one of the “largest obstacles to a successful Hague Convention” is “dealing with what some Member States
regard as excessive damages awards,” which has been a bone of contention between the United
States and Europe); Friedrich K. Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, 24 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 111, 113 (1998).
174. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820); see also supra text accompanying notes 91, 94.
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many countries have adopted standards different from those in the
United States.
3. Jury verdicts
The fact that an award was made by a jury does not exempt it
from the international rule that nations are liable for denials of justice in their courts. “The jury, after all, is but a particular kind of accessory in a chosen mechanism of judicial administration, a link in
the chain of justice which is ultimately open to inspection in all its
constituents by the processes of international law.”175 Judges and juries “are inseparable parts of the judicial organ, and for the act of either when it constitutes a denial of justice the state, it would seem,
should be equally responsible.”176
D.

Denial of “Fair and Equitable Treatment”

The basic denial of justice standard is heightened under NAFTA
Chapter 11 by inclusion of a “fair and equitable treatment” requirement in Article 1105. This is another of the provisions favored by
capital-exporting nations to protect their investments. The NAFTA
requirement was taken from the Model United States Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) and is found in several actual BITs. This
standard is intended to provide additional protection beyond the
normal baseline under international law.177 Under “fair and equitable
treatment” provisions, treaties are supposed to be interpreted in a
manner most favorable to the investor.178 Some commentators believe the standard goes much further in protecting foreign investments than the international minimum standard.179 Thus, it is arguable that even if a foreigner fails to make a persuasive claim of denial
of justice it would be protected by the “fair and equitable treatment”
standard.
175. FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 363.
176. J.W. Garner, International Responsibility of States for Judgments of Courts and Verdicts of Juries Amounting to Denial of Justice, 10 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 181, 185 (1929).
177. See KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY
AND PRACTICE 2, 76 (1992).
178. See K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on
Their Origin, Purposes, and General Treatment Standards, 4 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 105, 125
(1986).
179. F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 241, 244 (1981).
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E. Exhaustion of Local Remedies

These standards for denial of justice and fair and equitable treatment may suggest that international law sharply restricts state sovereignty by carefully probing judicial decisions. However, state sovereignty is in part preserved by a threshold requirement for bringing an
international claim: a claimant must have exhausted local remedies.
(This rule applies only to acts by a state that injure private parties and
not to acts by a state that directly injure another state.)180 Besides
limiting international interference with national sovereignty, which
spares interstate friction, the rule spares the resources involved in
litigating a claim in an international forum when national courts
might have provided redress instead.181 Domestic tribunals therefore
perform an international function in the sense of providing the first
phase of enforcement of international law.
It is possible that the United States government in its response to
Loewen’s Notice of Claim is arguing an exhaustion of local remedies
problem as a basis for the NAFTA panel’s lack of jurisdiction.182
However, according to the analysis in this section, such a claim likely
will not prove successful.
The usual requirement for exhaustion of local remedies is that
“[t]he alien must have unsuccessfully pursued all available modes of
appellate revision and have been brought face to face with a definitive pronouncement of the highest judicial body before such a complaint will be receivable.”183 In seeking review, a claimant is required
to use “reasonable diligence.”184 An alien need not try to resort to
extraordinary judicial remedies. The rule does not apply where there
are no regularly constituted courts to which access is open and practical.185

180. See de Visscher, supra note 89, at 425; FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 405.
181. See FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 416.
182. See supra text accompanying note 44.
183. FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 415; see also Ambatielos Case, 12 R.I.A.A. 82 (1956);
Adede, supra note 89, at 76 n.16; A.O. Adede, A Survey of Treaty Provisions on the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies, 18 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (1977); Ivan L. Head, A Fresh Look at the
Local Remedies Rule, 5 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 142 (1967).
184. FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 423.
185. Stelio Séfériadès, Le problème de l’accès des particuliers à des juridictions internationales, 51 RECUEIL DES COURS 5 (1935).
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1. Appeal bond requirements
This last exception—for cases where access to the courts is not
practical—may be very important for aliens bringing denial-of-justice
claims against the United States. Appeal bond requirements in some
southern states are high and serve to restrict access to appeal.186 The
problem famously arose in the 1987 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.187
case, in which a Texas jury found a $10.53 billion verdict against
New York-based Texaco and Texaco was required to post an appeal
bond of over $13 billion in order to have the case heard by the Texas
Supreme Court.188 Loewen found itself in a similar predicament. It
argues that it was effectively denied an appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court because of the appeal bond requirement of 125% of the
judgment—$625 million in Loewen’s case. Loewen claims that it
was not possible for it to finance this sum, neither through issuing
new debt nor through issuing new securities.189 Loewen filed motions with both the trial court judge and the Mississippi Supreme
Court to reduce the amount of the bond. Both courts are authorized
under Mississippi law to reduce the amount of the bond for “good
cause.” Both courts ruled there was not good cause for any reduction in the bond.190 Loewen, therefore, was faced with a set of
unpalatable options: spending over $200 million, unrecoverable, to
try to finance the appeal bond; not posting the bond and allowing
O’Keefe to begin levying on its assets in a week; or settling the case.
Loewen chose the last option and settled for $175 million. If
186. The Florida legislature, however, has recently limited its appeal bond requirement.
This was done in order to prevent private litigation from bankrupting tobacco companies, who
are also subject to a suit by the state. See Milo Geyelin, Florida Passes Measure Aiding Tobacco
Firms, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2000, at B16; Milo Geyelin & Gordon Fairclough, Taking a Hit:
Yes, $145 Billion Deals Tobacco a Huge Blow, But Not a Killing One, WALL ST. J., July 17,
2000, at A1.
187. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
188. Id. at 4–5.
189. Issuing new debt would have violated covenants with existing creditors, making
$736 million immediately due and payable. Issuing new securities, Loewen says, would have
cost at least $200 million for the first two years, and the company could have recovered virtually none of these costs even if it had been successful on appeal. See Loewen’s Notice of Claim,
supra note 34, at 43–44.
190. See id. at Appendix at A1078 (trial judge); Appendix at A1176 (Mississippi Supreme
Court). The Mississippi courts’ decisions not to reduce the bond requirement were unusual in
U.S. jurisprudence; typically courts do not require a full bond to be posted based on punitive
damages if such a requirement would potentially bankrupt the company. See, e.g., Olympia
Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 786 F.2d 794, 796–97 (7th Cir. 1986); Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 314 F. Supp. 94, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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chose the last option and settled for $175 million. If Loewen’s allegations are true, it is likely that an international tribunal would decide that access to the Mississippi Supreme Court was not “open and
practical” under the circumstances.
2. Petitions for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court
Ordinarily, a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court
might be required to exhaust local remedies under international law.
U.S. constitutional violations are arguably involved, and a potential
remedy for such violations is in the U.S. Supreme Court. If the
treatment of an alien was so grave as to possibly constitute a denial of
justice under international law, it almost certainly implicates the Due
Process Clause and perhaps other guarantees of the U.S. Constitution. Although petitions for certiorari are rarely granted, an attempt
may still be required under international law, even if the remedy does
not have a good chance of success.191 The normal requirement of petitioning to the U.S. Supreme Court becomes problematic, however,
if a high state court appeal bond prevents normal review in state
courts.
Before addressing the issue of procedural obstacles, it is worth
considering the chances of success on the merits for a petition based
on the Due Process Clause in a case such as Loewen’s. Claims under
the Due Process Clause might include the excessiveness of the punitive damages award, the impropriety of elected judges presiding over
cases involving out-of-state defendants (or of electing judges generally), and the unfairness of the appeal bond requirement. To put the
matter succinctly, none of these claims is especially likely to succeed.
First, as noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to interfere to any great extent with punitive damage awards in state
courts.192 Although the Court did set out some guidelines for controlling punitive damages in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,193
commentators tend to agree that these guidelines are vague and provide little concrete guidance for state and lower federal courts to fol-

191. “[T]he mere expectation that an injustice will be done by the courts is not enough
to excuse a party’s failure to test out remedies which are presumably sufficient.” FREEMAN,
supra note 104, at 421. See also Letter from Mr. Olney to Mr. Hamlin, July 16, 1896, in 6
MOORE, supra note 153, at 272.
192. See supra note 7.
193. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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low.194 Empirical studies have shown that punitive damage awards
have not been significantly affected by BMW v. Gore thus far,195 and
the U.S. Supreme Court has shown itself unwilling to venture into
the foray again recently. In Loewen’s particular case, the “guideposts” set out in BMW v. Gore do not necessarily indicate the U.S.
Supreme Court would reverse the decision below.196 Looking at the
second factor, the disparity between harm to the plaintiff and the
punitive damages award, the Court noted that in an earlier case it
had found that a punitive damages award of more than four times
the amount of compensatory damages was “close to the line” but
was not unconstitutional.197 In any case, the Court refused to set a
mathematical formula.198 The punitive damages award in Loewen
was four times the amount of compensatory damages.
Second, the Supreme Court has not questioned the constitutionality of electing judges. Commentators have been increasingly vociferous in arguing that electing judges denies litigants their due process right to an impartial tribunal, at least under certain circumstances
such as when lawyers or parties have made contributions to a judge’s
campaign.199 An ad hoc ABA committee has even recommended specific new rules for disqualification of judges resulting from contributions to judges’ election campaigns.200 But the U.S. Supreme Court
194. See supra note 7.
195. See id.
196. The guideposts included “the degree of reprehensibility of the nondisclosure; the
disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by [plaintiff] and his punitive damages
award; and the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases.” 517 U.S. at 575.
197. Id. at 581 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1991)).
198. Id. at 582.
199. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the
Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 498
(1986); Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign
Contributions, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449, 463 (1988); Leonard A. Bennett, Comment, The Impossibility of Impartiality: Interest in Judicial Reelection as a Denial of Due Process for a Criminal
Defendant, 4 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 275 (1994); Mark Andrew Grannis, Note, Safeguarding the Litigant’s Constitutional Right to a Fair and Impartial Forum: A Due Process Approach to Improprieties Arising from Judicial Campaign Contributions from Lawyers, 86 MICH.
L. REV. 382 (1987); Scott D. Wiener, Note, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 189 (1996).
200. See ABA Ad Hoc Comm. on Judicial Campaign Finance, Am. Bar Ass’n, Report to
the House of Delegates (May 5, 1999) (visited Feb. 12, 2001) <http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/adhoc599.html>. These would require a judge to disqualify himself or herself in instances
when a party or party’s lawyer has contributed a threshold amount to the judge’s campaign. See
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has not weighed in. Various cases hold that a judge who has a financial interest in the outcome of the case, even an indirect interest, is
not sufficiently impartial for constitutional purposes.201 But, beyond
expressing a certain distaste for judicial elections,202 the U.S. Supreme Court has not held that elected judges must recuse themselves
even if they have received campaign contributions from the parties or
lawyers before them. It is of course possible that the Court might so
hold but certainly not predictable. In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie,
the Court stated that most matters relating to judicial disqualification
do not rise to a constitutional level and that disqualification because
of bias would only be required in extreme cases.203 And, indeed, the
Texas Supreme Court cited Lavoie in declining to hold that a judge
should be disqualified under the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution because opposing counsel made a $10,000 contribution to the judge’s campaign.204
Third, on the question whether the Mississippi appeal bond requirement is constitutional, it seems likely the Supreme Court would
not find a violation. The Court has repeatedly stated that appeals are
not required under the U.S. Constitution at all, for either criminal or
civil cases.205 However, if an appeal is provided by a state, the avenues of appellate review “must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions”206 under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. In
id. Proposed Canon 3(E)(1).
201. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522–23 (1927) (holding unconstitutional system
in which adjudicator, the town’s mayor, received compensation each time he convicted a defendant but nothing if he acquitted); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972)
(holding unconstitutional system in which adjudicator, the town’s mayor, received no compensation from convictions, but the town received the proceeds of fines resulting from convictions). Other cases involving the concern that adjudicators be reasonably free from bias or risk
of bias are collected in Wiener, supra note 199, at 191 n.25.
202. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400–01 (1991) (addressing voting rights
question in the context of a judicial election, stating: “The fundamental tension between the
ideal character of the judicial office and the real world of electoral politics cannot be resolved
by crediting judges with total indifference to the popular will while simultaneously requiring
them to run for elected office.”).
203. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821 (1986). Aetna held that a justice
of the Alabama Supreme Court was not disqualified under the Due Process Clause for harboring dislike of insurance companies but was disqualified because he should not decide a legal
issue that would stand as precedent in another pending case in which the same justice was a
litigant. Id. at 824–25.
204. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 844–45 (Tex. 1987).
205. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110 (1996).
206. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966).
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civil cases, this has come to mean two things. First, financial barriers
must not be imposed on an indigent appellant in cases involving a
fundamental right, such as divorce or termination of parental
rights.207 Second, much higher barriers may not be imposed on certain specific classes of litigants, such as tenants appealing eviction decisions.208 The Loewen case would appear to fall into neither of these
categories. In general, the Court has held that financial restrictions
on appeal in civil cases are not unconstitutional.209
There is thus not a substantial likelihood of success on the merits
for a litigant such as Loewen before the U.S. Supreme Court. But
before the merits are even reached in the Court, there are a number
of procedural hurdles to overcome in a case like Loewen’s. The Supreme Court has its own exhaustion of local remedies rule in the
form of 28 U.S.C. § 1257. This statute governs petitions for writ of
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court from decisions of state courts.
Two prerequisites must be met before review is possible. First, a substantial federal question must be properly raised in the state court
proceedings for the U.S. Supreme Court to have jurisdiction.210 The
Court has enforced this requirement tenaciously. Loewen did make
federal constitutional arguments to the Mississippi courts in its motions to reduce the appeal bond211 and so overcame this first hurdle.
Second, § 1257 only provides for petitions from “[f]inal judgments
or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had.” The Court has been more flexible about this finality requirement than the federal question requirement. It has
given the finality requirement a “practical rather than a technical
construction.”212 For its jurisdictional purposes, “final” means a state
court judgment that conclusively disposes of a matter that is distinct

207. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 113. See also Henry v. First Nat’l Bank of Clarksdale, 595
F.2d 291, 299–305 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding district court decision granting relief from requirement of filing bond pending appeal of Mississippi state court judgment because case involved First and Fourteenth Amendments and Civil Rights Act of 1871).
208. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 79 (1972).
209. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S.
656, 660 (1973); M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 114–16.
210. See, e.g., Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 439 (1969). This requirement goes
back to interpretations given to section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. See cases cited in
Crowell v. Randell, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 368, 391–98 (1836).
211. See Motion for Stay of Enforcement of Final Judgment Pending Appeal, in
Loewen’s Notice of Claim, supra note 34, at Appendix A838.
212. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
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from the general subject of the litigation and affects only the parties
to the particular controversy.213 (This is similar to the collateral order
doctrine that applies to petitions for review of lower federal court
decisions.)
A litigant such as Loewen could argue that an order of the highest state court denying reduction of the appeal bond is a collateral
decision reviewable under § 1257. Some members of the U.S. Supreme Court, however, have been strict about the finality requirement in the context of an appeal bond. According to them in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., the loser’s right not to be arbitrarily denied
an appeal could be “adequately vindicated even if Texaco were
forced to file for bankruptcy” when judgment was executed because
the loser failed to file the ($13 billion) appeal bond.214
By contrast, an international tribunal, under the “open and practical” standard, would not likely view bankruptcy as necessary to exhaust local remedies. In order to petition the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari before execution of the judgment, a defendant
would have to apply to the Court for an emergency stay of enforcement proceedings. International law may well view this as an extraordinary remedy and therefore unnecessary to exhaust local remedies.
The bottom line is that in ordinary cases a foreign litigant probably must petition for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court to satisfy
the exhaustion of local remedies rule under international law. But in
the case of a high state appeal bond, this may not be necessary. To
be on the safe side, alien litigants should take care to raise all conceivable federal issues at the state level, including NAFTA issues,
where there is a question of an appeal bond.
F. Federal Responsibility for State Denials of Justice
There is little doubt that the United States could be held responsible for denials of justice on the part of a state. Article 105 of
NAFTA provides: “The Parties shall ensure that all necessary measures are taken in order to give effect to the provisions of this Agree213. See Clark v. Williard, 292 U.S. 112, 117–19 (1934); Mercantile Nat’l Bank v.
Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 557–58 (1963) (invoking jurisdiction over Texas Supreme Court
order that had improperly interpreted a federal statute dealing with the venue of suits against
national banks).
214. 481 U.S. 1, 18 (1987) (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., concurring); see id. at 28
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
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ment, including their observance, except as otherwise provided in
this Agreement, by state and provincial governments.” The U.S.
Statement of Administrative Action on NAFTA declares that “no
country can avoid its commitments under the Agreement by claiming that the measure in question is a matter of state or provincial jurisdiction.”215 This was also the understanding of the U.S. Trade
Representative at the time NAFTA was approved.216 In this respect,
NAFTA codifies basic principles of international law: federal responsibility for a political subdivision’s acts is well established.217 The U.S.
State Department recognized this principle when it refused to argue
that the United States was not liable for the misconduct of Texas officials; when the United States had similar claims, “we have invariably
insisted on the liability of the Federal Government although the failure . . . was chargeable to the officials of one of the constituent

states or provinces.”218
V. PROBLEMS WITH HOLDING THE U.S. RESPONSIBLE FOR
DENIALS OF JUSTICE
The U.S. legal system indeed suffers from problems that have so
far proved resistant to internal efforts at reform. But the NAFTA
cure may be worse than the disease. It could seriously undermine the
sovereign ability of the United States to distribute power within a
federal system and to organize its civil justice system. The success of
Loewen-type claims threatens sovereignty with two categories of
problems: first, problems when international bodies of any sort make
awards compensating for U.S. judgments and, second, problems specific to arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11.

215. H.R. DOC. NO. 103-159, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., v. 2, at 5 (1993).
216. See Letter from Michael Kantor, supra note 52.
217. See 2 ROBERTO AGO, Third Report on State Responsibility, Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N
199, 257 (1971) (“The attribution to a federal State of the acts of organs of its component
states, in cases where such acts enter into consideration at the international level as a source of
responsibility, is also a firmly established principle.”); see also International Law Commission,
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 4, (visited Feb. 21, 2001) <http://www.un.org/
ilc/index.htm>.
218. Political Subdivisions, 5 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 527, 594 (1943); see also DeGalvan Claim (Mexico v. United
States), OPINIONS OF THE COMMISSIONERS 408 (1927).
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A. Traditional Concerns About Interfering With Judgments

Since the 1930s at least, the traditional concerns about an international tribunal holding a country liable for decisions of its courts
have been downplayed. These concerns are likely to resurface in the
wake of international agreements such as NAFTA. They may not be
powerful enough to justify eliminating denial-of-justice claims from
international grounds of action, but they do counsel caution in the
way these claims are handled.
International tribunals have traditionally been reluctant to review
judgments for three main reasons. First, local law was assumed to ensure the “separation and independence” of the judiciary from the
government.219 The government was therefore thought to have no
control over actions of the judiciary, so holding the government liable was pointless. Also, because this separation supposedly freed the
judiciary from political concerns, its judgments were less suspect than
other governmental actions. Second, “respect for the finality of judicial decisions” counseled against upsetting these decisions.220 Third,
second-guessing judicial decisions would interfere with the internal
organization of a country’s government, and in particular with principles of federalism.221 Are these reasons still valid?
1. The separation and independence of the judiciary
The first principle, the separation and independence of the judiciary from the government, depends on a notion that the government is distinct from the state. For Europeans, “the government”
suggests political involvement and direct responsibility to the electorate, whereas “the state” suggests officials who are more apolitical
and permanent.222 But in the United States, “state” and “government” are largely viewed as interchangeable terms, and, in international law, the distinction between government and state is likewise
ceasing to matter. The former president of the International Court
of Justice has pointed out that “[a]lthough independent of the Government, the judiciary is not independent of the State: the judgment
219. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century
278 RECUEIL DES COURS (1978).
220. Id.
221. See FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 36.
222. European judges, for example, often insist that they are not part of the government,
although they serve the state.
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given by a judicial authority emanates from an organ of the State in
just the same way as a law promulgated by the legislature or a decision taken by the executive.”223
One might still say that a rationale behind this distinction between government and state remains valid: that judges are in fact
relatively free from political pressure and impartial compared to other
branches and so can be better trusted not to discriminate against
outsiders. So, it could be argued, the distinction should be resurrected and judgments should be treated differently from other acts.
In this view,
It is true that courts are organs of the nation; but they are not its
organs in the sense in which the executive and the legislature are.
The executive and the legislature represent the expression of its
will. The courts of justice represent the colorless and impartial expression of justice in the interpretation of its will.224

However, this approach poses several difficulties. It is hard to argue
that the judiciary is “colorless and impartial” in places—like Mississippi—where judges are elected. Elected judges begin to look more
like political officials, responsible to the electorate (and to their campaign contributors).225 Furthermore, the American use of juries as
fact-finders in civil cases means that judges are not the only group to
be considered. Through juries, in theory, the electorate speaks directly. Tocqueville said that the American jury was “as direct and extreme a consequence of the dogma of the sovereignty of the people
as universal suffrage.”226 Juries are supposed to inject into decisions
of courts an element of popular common sense, to temper the aloofness of the judiciary. American fact-finders are thus closer to popular
opinion and the European idea of “the government.” American ju223. Jiménez de Aréchaga, supra note 219, at 278.
224. THOMAS BATY, THE CANONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 127–28 (1930). International tribunals have sometimes adopted this view. In one example, the Yuille, Shortridge &
Co. case, the British government brought a claim on behalf of a company for losses in a judgment of a Portuguese court. The Senate of Hamburg, chosen to adjudicate the claim, declared
it to be “altogether unjust to require the Royal Government of Portugal to answer for the misconduct of its court,” since these courts were “completely independent of the Government and
the latter was consequently unable to exert any influence over their decisions.” 2 ALBERT DE
LAPRADELLE & NICHOLAS POLITIS, RECUEIL DES ARBITRAGES INTERNATIONAUX 78, 103
(1923).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 122–35. Even appointed judges in the United
States are relatively political, in part because of the way in which they are appointed.
226. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 273 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969).
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ries are, however, independent of “the government” in the American
sense because they are not regular officials. Those who highly prize
this independence greatly resent attempts to interfere with it through
international arbitration.
Even in situations where the judiciary is formally separate and independent, judges are connected to political processes. Though
separate from the legislature and executive, judges are still bound to
apply local statutes and carry out the legislature’s will. Therefore, the
ultimate source of a judgment that violates international law may
well be an act of the legislature. This suggests that national responsibility for the acts of the judiciary should not be entirely excused.
Perhaps instead that responsibility should be reduced by placing a
greater burden on the claimant to show that a decision is unjust.
2. Respect for the finality of judicial decisions: Res judicata
Arguably, respect for the finality of judicial decisions should bar
international litigation of the basis for a judgment. A judgment is an
especially potent expression of sovereignty. It is usually clothed in
great dignity, and it often represents considerable investment of state
resources into a decision of particular questions between specific parties. At some point, litigants are entitled to certainty. These traditional concerns of res judicata doctrine similarly pertain if several
sovereigns are involved. The U.S. constitutional doctrine of Full
Faith and Credit,227 for example, preserves judgments from collateral
attack in a multi-state system. While Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence gives states wide latitude in deciding whether or not to apply
other states’ laws,228 it strictly requires recognition of other states’
judgments. Under the Full Faith and Credit doctrine, states must
recognize another state’s judgment even if that judgment was based
on a clear legal mistake (involving a different state’s law, no less).229
Expense is spared and interstate friction is reduced by the impossibility of second-guessing another state’s judgment.
There are several responses to this argument (that a doctrine resembling res judicata should apply in international cases involving
prior national court decisions).230 First, the parties to an international
227.
228.
229.
230.

See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
A doctrine of res judicata does exist regarding earlier international cases.
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arbitration are different from the parties to the original action. In the
case of traditional arbitration between states, the parties would be
entirely different, although one state would be bringing claims on
behalf of the injured national. Second, international arbitration in
general is powerless to affect the original judgment. The judgment
stands, so the relationship between the original parties is not affected. Third, the legal issues are usually different. The courts in the
original action are ordinarily concerned with questions of purely internal law, whereas the only question an international arbitral panel
asks is whether an international obligation was violated.
But these responses are less than satisfying. Regarding the parties, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel as opposed to res judicata (or issue preclusion as opposed to claim preclusion), the parties
need not be the same.231 Regarding the legal issues, the court hearing the original dispute may decide questions of international law,
incorporated into national law. It could be argued that those issues
should have been raised, because federal law includes treaties and the
law of nations and state courts may decide most federal law issues.
The better argument against applying preclusion principles to a
national judgment is that there currently is no international forum
available to monitor local courts’ compliance with international law.
There is no court able to play a supervisory role in the international
system, like the U.S. Supreme Court’s role in the U.S. system, able
to ensure that the states comply with federal law. The Full Faith and
Credit doctrine is applied as strictly as it is to require states to enforce each other’s judgments in part because there is available this
avenue of direct review in the U.S. Supreme Court. American states
are all bound by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and by U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of that clause, so
that a minimum baseline of due process is assured. (The states also
have relatively similar legal standards.) The standards from nation to
nation are different, so judgments (as to international law claims) at
the national level should not be given preclusive effect at the international level. However, considerations of finality counsel caution
when international tribunals consider whether a national decision
violates international law.

231. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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3. Interference with traditional aspects of U.S. political organization:
The civil justice system and federalism
Perhaps the greatest problem with international denial-of-justice
claims is that they could interfere with deep-rooted national political
arrangements. In the case of the United States, these arrangements
include specific aspects of the civil justice system and broader principles of federalism. International arbitration awards against the federal
government based on state court denials of justice could provoke a
backlash in the United States against international agreements like
NAFTA and the budding Free Trade Agreement of the Americas.232
The previous discussion of denial-of-justice claims listed four key
features of American civil justice as possible violations: elected
judges, jury awards, aggressive advocacy, and punitive damages. Each
of these is supported by powerful interest groups and by many voters.233 They have tremendous symbolic significance and some practical impact on redistribution of wealth. A decision against the United
States in a case like Loewen could raise the cry of interference with
U.S. sovereignty and a democratically-chosen legal system.
The federal government’s liability for state denials of justice under international law may also cause strain in federal-state relations.
States traditionally have been given considerable freedom in designing their civil justice systems; dual sovereignty is very much alive in
this area. But to prevent liability under NAFTA or other treaties, the
federal government might well take steps that would affect state civil
cases.
a. Federal government suing states for indemnity under common
law principles. One possible step is indemnity. The United States
government might try to sue a state government for violating
NAFTA obligations. It could seek indemnity under common law
principles in the absence of a relevant federal statute. But recent Supreme Court precedent has been hostile toward creation of federal
common law. Cases in which such creation is proper are “‘few and
restricted’” and “extraordinary,”234 where a “‘significant conflict be232. The famous demonstrations and riots that derailed WTO meetings in Seattle in December 1999 show the hostility that exists toward trade agreements and globalization in some
quarters. See, e.g., John Burgess & Steven Pearlstein, Protests Delay WTO Opening, WASH.
POST, Dec. 1, 1999, at A1; Steven Pearlstein, Trade Theory Collides With Angry Reality,
WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1999, at A1.
233. See the discussions of the reactions of ATLA and Public Citizen, supra notes 64–66.
234. O’Melveny & Meyers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87, 89 (1994) (quoting Wheeldin v.
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tween some federal policy or interest and the use of state law.’”235
This limitation contemplates creation of federal common law only to
preempt state law, not to create a cause of action to indemnify the
United States for a state’s wrongdoing.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has declined to use common law
principles to provide indemnity for the United States. The United
States has brought suit for indemnity under common law principles
against private parties, and these suits have failed. In United States v.
Standard Oil Co.,236 for example, a Standard Oil truck hit a U.S. soldier, who was hospitalized and disabled for a period. The United
States brought suit against Standard Oil, seeking compensation for
medical services and wages the soldier received while incapacitated.
The Supreme Court held that federal (and not state) law applied, but
it would not create federal common law to provide indemnity.
Whether to provide indemnity was a question only Congress could
resolve, not the courts or the executive. Congress “is the custodian
of the national purse” and “most often the exclusive arbiter of federal fiscal affairs. And these comprehend . . . securing the treasury or
the government against financial losses however inflicted.”237 “Until
it acts to establish the liability, this Court and others should withhold creative touch.”238 On separation of powers principles, therefore, the Court would not step in. It seems even less likely the Court
would create federal common law to provide indemnity against a
state, which would add complicated questions of federalism to the
separation-of-powers concerns.
b. Possible reactions by Congress. Congress might have the power
to create such liability, however. It could conceivably do so under its
powers to pay the debts of the United States and to regulate comWheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)). See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1250 (1996) (describing the Supreme
Court’s approach “limit[ing] the scope of federal common law to several well-recognized enclaves”).
235. O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 87 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S.
63, 68 (1966)).
236. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
237. Id. at 314–15.
238. Id. at 317. The Court cited United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32 (1812) (holding that federal courts may not punish common law crimes); see also
United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954) (holding that United States may not recover
indemnity from one of its employees after it had been held liable under the Federal Tort
Claims Act for the negligence of the employee). See Clark, supra note 234, at 1361–68 (discussing separation-of-powers limitations on creation of federal common law causes of action).
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merce with foreign nations.239 Even if Congress did not authorize a
direct suit against states whose court systems violated NAFTA, it
could exert pressure on such states through the Spending Clause not
to commit further violations. For example, Congress could deduct
the amount of any damages awarded against the United States from
block grants to the offending state.240 Regardless of whether direct
indemnity or indirect pressure was used, action by the U.S. government against the states would create tension in the federal system.
B. Problems with the NAFTA Mechanism: Procedures
Besides the general problems with subjecting American judgments to denial-of-justice claims, NAFTA’s specific mechanism for
doing so is flawed.241 There are problems with subjecting govern239. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
240. This would seem to be permissible based on the holding of South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
241. A threshold issue, though beyond the scope of this article, should at least be mentioned: the possibility that NAFTA itself is unconstitutional under the Treaty Clause. See U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2. NAFTA was approved using “fast-track” procedures involving majority
votes of both the House and Senate, rather than a two-thirds vote of the Senate as the Treaty
Clause specifies.
An original purpose of requiring a super-majority of the Senate to ratify treaties was
to make it easier to block treaties that might affect state sovereignty and federalism. See Bruce
Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 809–10
(1995). There has been a lively academic skirmish on this topic in the Harvard Law Review.
Professors Ackerman and Golove argued that a “constitutional moment” occurred in the
1940s when the American people agreed to bypass the traditional treaty procedures in favor of
giving President Roosevelt greater power to deal with the aftermath of World War II. This
“constitutional moment,” the authors argue, was driven in part by American embarrassment at
the Senate’s failure to ratify Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations treaty after World War I
and by expanding federal power during the New Deal. Id. at 861–66. Professor Tribe heartily
opposed this view of the Treaty Clause and, indeed, the method of constitutional interpretation in general. Tribe criticized the “prevailing view,” as characterized by the Third Restatement, that a congressional-executive agreement “‘can be used as an alternative to the treaty
method in every instance.’” Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections
on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1250 (1995)
(commenting on and quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. e (1987)); cf. Michael Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the
(Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133 (1998). The most recent version of Professor Tribe’s
treatise, however, grudgingly acknowledges that “the congressional-executive agreement appears for now to have found a settled place in United States foreign relations practice.” 1
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-4, at 656 (3d ed. 2000). The
issue of NAFTA’s constitutionality is now being litigated in the Eleventh Circuit. Unions, including the United Steelworkers of America, brought an action against the United States challenging the constitutionality of NAFTA. In July 1999, the district court decided that the
President and Congress had power to make and approve the agreement using “fast-track” pro-
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ments to potentially large judgments based on international investorstate arbitration under Chapter 11. The very features of the ICSID
that make the forum so effective for basic commercial arbitration are
ill-suited to address politically explosive issues central to sovereignty.
These features include the composition of the arbitral panels, the secrecy of arbitration, and the lack of effective appellate review.
1. The problem of arbitrator bias
Arbitral panels under NAFTA normally follow the standard tripartite model of international arbitration.242 Unless the parties agree
otherwise, the arbitral tribunal consists of three arbitrators. Each of
the parties appoints one, and the third—who is the presiding arbitrator—is appointed by agreement of the parties.243 If parties fail to
agree or appoint an arbitrator, the Secretary General of ICSID appoints him or her. The Secretary General makes appointments from a
roster of 45 arbitrators established by consensus of the NAFTA Parties. A presiding arbitrator appointed by the Secretary General may
not be a national of either of the parties.244 Decisions are reached by
a majority of the panel.245
One view is that arbitration is best thought of as an outgrowth of
contract law, rather than as a form of adjudication.246 An inquiry into
arbitration ought to determine what were the understandings and
assumptions of the contracting parties, not whether it is “fair” or
whether due process is provided. This conflicts with the notion in international arbitration that the arbitrators, even those chosen by the
parties, will be independent and impartial.247 This aspiration may be
cedures. See Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (N.D. Ala.
1999). Plaintiffs have appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. Union Announces Appeal in Case Challenging NAFTA, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1445 (1999).
242. See Gantz, supra note 78, at 43–45.
243. See NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1123.
244. See id. art. 1124.
245. See The World Bank Group International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Schedule C, Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, art. 25 (visited Oct. 26, 2000)
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/33.htm> [hereinafter ICSID AF Rules].
246. See Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 487
(1997).
247. See INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, ETHICS FOR INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATORS arts. 3 (requirement of “impartiality and independence”), 5 (arbitrator should
avoid ex parte communications with any party regarding the arbitration); GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 63–71 (1994); W.
LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION
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unrealistic in practice. Even if an arbitrator chosen by one of the parties has no professional or financial relationship with the party, she
may still favor that party because of shared nationality or legal, political, or economic outlook.248 This is viewed as an advantage because
party-appointed arbitrators can ensure that the presiding arbitrator
(or “president”) fully understands the issues at stake, the background
of the case, and the implications of an award.249 But because these
party-appointed arbitrators are a blend of judge and advocate,
American arbitration rules do not hold them to the same standard of
impartiality as arbitrators appointed in other ways.250 Moreover,
many party-selected arbitrators seem to overplay their roles as advocates. In choosing the party-appointed arbitrator, parties prefer a
candidate who “‘knows just how far he can go in advocacy’ without
losing all credibility with his colleagues.”251
American courts have said that this tripartite model creates a
neutral tribunal because biases in either direction are offset.252
Though the president is supposed to have the controlling voice, she
must obtain a majority to decide the case. Often tribunal presidents
must bargain with one arbitrator or the other to arrive at a decision
(or try to play the two party-appointed arbitrators off each other).
The decision thus often differs from what the president would have
decided alone.253 This process of negotiation and compromise may

§§ 12.04, 13.03, 13.05 (3d ed. 2000); ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 201, 218–26 (2d ed. 1991).
248. See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 247, at 212, 233; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The PartyAppointed Arbitrator in International Controversies: Some Reflections, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 59,
60, 69 (1995); William W. Park, Neutrality, Predictability and Economic Co-operation, 12 J.
INT’L ARB. 99, 105 (1995).
249. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
396 (1978); Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 WIS. L. REV. 3,
36–37; Arnold M. Zack, Tripartite Panels: Asset or Hindrance in Dispute Settlement?,
PROCEEDINGS, 34TH ANNUAL MEETING, NAT’L ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 273, 279
(1982).
250. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, Rules
12, 19.
251. Rau, supra note 246, at 508.
252. See, e.g., Tate v. Saratoga Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 265 Cal. Rptr. 440, 445 (Ct. App.
1989).
253. See Martin Hunter, Ethics of the International Arbitrator, ARB., Nov. 1987, at 219,
222 (neutral president often must “take a deep breath and select one of the party-nominated
arbitrators to negotiate with” to arrive at a majority award); Rau, supra note 246, at 501–02;
Murray L. Smith, Impartiality of the Party-Appointed Arbitrator, 6 ARB. INT’L 320, 333
(1990) (requiring a majority “could lead to a negotiated majority award that is not based solely
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well be effective in ordinary commercial arbitration, but it seems a
problematic method for resolving difficult questions of international
law affecting national sovereignty. The persuasive skills of the partyappointed arbitrators and the bargaining skills of the president could
predominate over the merits of the case.
2. Confidentiality
Another feature of the arbitration regimes specified by NAFTA is
confidentiality. Again, while perhaps desirable in the resolution of a
commercial dispute between private parties, confidentiality is troubling in the context of weighty issues of sovereignty254 and the functioning of court systems. Arbitrations in the ICSID Additional Facility occur in two phases: a written phase and an oral hearing. Both
the filings submitted in the written phase and the oral hearings are
confidential if a party desires it. Minutes are made of the oral hearings, but these minutes may not be published without the consent of
the parties.255 Under UNCITRAL rules, hearings are held in camera
unless the parties agree otherwise.256 (In the ICSID proper, even the
award may not be published without the consent of the parties.)257
ICSID’s Additional Facility at least publishes basic docket information on its new website regarding cases pending before that tribunal.258 ICSID and UNCITRAL do not even do that, so the public
might never find out about an arbitration in those fora. Governments have no obligations under these arbitration rules to disclose
cases pending against them. The press learned of Loewen’s notice of
claim against the U.S. government from a brief mention in its SEC
10-Q report.

on the merits of the case”).
254. See Gantz, supra note 78.
255. See ICSID AF Rules, supra note 245, art. 44(2). The Additional Facility rules also
specify that, as early as possible after the tribunal is constituted, the president must try “to ascertain the views of the parties regarding on questions of procedure.” Id. art. 29(1). These
would include questions of confidentiality.
256. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Arbitration Rules (1976),
art. 25 (visited Nov. 30, 2000) <http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.arbitration.rules.1976/
toc.html> [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules].
257. See The World Bank Group International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, Part D, Rule 48 (visited Nov. 30, 2000)
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/63.htm> [hereinafter ICSID Rules].
258. See List of Pending Cases, supra note 43.

284

4LET-FIN.DOC

229]

2/22/01 8:19 PM

International Pressure to Harmonize

This lack of disclosure is common in arbitrations. It may well aid
in the speedy and effective resolution of most commercial disputes
by minimizing the collateral consequences of litigation, such as unpleasant publicity. However, the arguments in favor of disclosure are
much stronger when the issue in question is the fairness of a judicial
decision and the government is a party. If courts in America are
reaching decisions that are denials of justice, courts’ reasoning
should be aired publicly. Furthermore, the subject matter of the dispute is not simply a matter of public concern; it is itself public. Trials,
judicial decisions, and jury verdicts are public in the United States,
and so little additional harm could be done by opening the hearings
that deal with these questions.
The confidentiality of proceedings is linked with a lack of input
from others outside the process. There is no provision for amicus
briefs under the NAFTA investor-state arbitration system. NAFTA’s
investor-dispute mechanism does allow NAFTA Parties to make
submissions resembling amicus briefs to an arbitration panel on
questions involving the interpretation of NAFTA.259 For example, in
the Loewen case, Canada could make a submission to the panel. Also,
the arbitration panel could appoint experts to report in writing on
factual issues concerning environmental, health, safety, or other scientific matters raised by a disputing party. But these issues are limited in scope. They do not include expert consideration of a country’s or state’s legal system.260 The NAFTA provisions about
arbitration—as well as rules of ICSID, ICSID-AF, and
UNCITRAL—do not allow nonparties to submit amicus briefs. The
state of Mississippi, for instance, in theory, cannot be heard directly
in the Loewen case. Thus, on important questions concerning a
country’s legal system, a very limited number of voices will be heard.
Recent developments indicate that occasionally Chapter 11 panels
may accept amicus briefs from nongovernmental organizations, but
it remains to be seen how wide spread this practice becomes.261
259. See NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1124.
260. See id. art. 1133.
261. In one Chapter 11 dispute, the arbitration panel allowed a nongovernmental organization to file an amicus curiae brief. See Peter Menyasz, NAFTA Panel Says NGOs Can
Intervene in Cases Brought for Arbitration Purposes, 18 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 211 (Feb. 1,
2001). This occurred in the Methanex case, brought by the Canadian Methanex Corporation
against the United States because of California’s 1999 decision to ban the gasoline additive
MTBE. Methanex is claiming $970 million in damages. Peter Menyasz, Canadian, U.S. Governments Support IISD on Access to Chapter 11 Tribunal Process, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA)
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If a dispute settles, the results of that settlement are not made
public. NAFTA is designed to strongly encourage settlement before
arbitration.262 To submit a claim to arbitration, the claimant must
wait six months after the events giving rise to that claim.263 At least
ninety days before the claim is submitted, the claimant must give
written notice to the other party of its “intention to submit a claim.”
It must specify “the provisions of [NAFTA] alleged to have been
breached,” “the issues and factual basis for the claim,” and “the relief
sought and the approximate amount of damages claimed.”264 These
six-month and ninety-day periods are intended to give the parties
time for settlement negotiations. If a government and private party
settle the claim before arbitration, such a settlement might not be
made public. The public might not discover that the government
was paying out substantial sums because of failures of justice in state
or federal courts.
3. Lack of appeal
Appeals from arbitral decisions under NAFTA are strictly limited.
The limited appeal makes the arbitration process efficient, which is
highly desirable in private commercial arbitration. Under ICSID Additional Facility rules, within forty-five days after the award a party
may request an interpretation of the award265 or a correction for “any
clerical, arithmetical or similar errors.”266 Also within that time period, either party may request that the tribunal decide any question
that it failed to decide in the award.267 That is the extent of review.
There can be no reconsideration of issues already decided.
UNCITRAL rules provide for almost identical procedures.268
1901 (Dec. 14, 2000). Both the U.S. and Canadian governments supported the participation
of the NGO, the International Institute for Sustainable Development. Id. Although this ruling
is not binding on other NAFTA panels, it may prove influential.
262. See NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1118.
263. See id. art. 1120(1).
264. Id. art. 1119.
265. See ICSID AF Rules, supra note 245, art. 56.
266. Id. art. 57.
267. See id. art. 58.
268. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 256, arts. 35–37. Parties must request an interpretation, correction, or supplementary award within 30 after the award is made.
There are somewhat different procedures in the ICSID itself, which provide for more thorough
review. But these procedures do not apply to arbitrations under NAFTA, since neither Mexico
nor Canada is a member of ICSID. Besides allowing supplementary decision, correction, and
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These awards are binding on the parties. NAFTA declares that
each NAFTA Party “shall provide for the enforcement of an award in
its territory.”269 If a NAFTA Party fails to comply with a final award,
the investor’s home country may begin proceedings against the losing Party under Chapter 20. A panel established under that chapter
may determine that the losing Party has violated its NAFTA obligations and recommend that the Party comply with the terms of the
award. Failure to do so may trigger the right of the investor’s country to suspend benefits it provides under NAFTA.270 Other international agreements can be brought into play to enforce an award. An
investor can seek enforcement of an award under the ICSID Convention, the New York Convention, or the Inter-American Convention.271 All of these provide tough enforcement mechanisms.272
The requirement of reasoned decision making partially compensates for the lack of an appeal. Each of the arbitration regimes specified under NAFTA requires that the award be in writing and the reasons stated.273 A requirement of reasoned decision making is
interpretation of the award, there are procedures for revision and annulment. See ICSID Rules,
supra note 257, Rule 50. Revision is meant to deal with evidence that the tribunal was not able
to consider previously, and may be done by the panel itself. Annulment is a more elaborate
procedure. Grounds for annulment include the tribunal being improperly constituted, exceeding its powers, being corrupt, seriously departing from a fundamental rule of procedure, or
failing to state the reasons on which the award is based. See id. The Chairman of the Administrative Council of ICSID has appointed committees to review claims of annulment, see id. Rule
52, and these committees have proved controversial. The procedure for annulment is so slow
that it casts doubt on the ICSID’s efficiency. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL
IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 46–106
(1992). It should be noted that the grounds for annulment are still limited and do not include
review of the substance of the tribunal’s decision.
269. NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1136(4).
270. See id. art. 1136.
271. See id. art. 1136(6).
272. The ICSID Convention, to which the United States is a signatory, provides that
each contracting state is obligated to enforce an award “within its territories as if it were a final
judgment of a court in that State.” The World Bank Group, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States, pt. A, ch. IV, art. 54(1) (visited Oct. 26, 2000)
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/9.htm>. This is even more potent than the New
York Convention. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards; Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration.
273. See ICSID Rules, supra note 257, Rule 47; ICSID AF Rules, supra note 245, art.
53(1) (panel must also address every question submitted to it); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
supra note 256, art. 32 (reasons must be given unless parties have agreed that no reasons are to
be given).
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conceptually linked with judicial appeal to enable review of the decision below. But it may constrain decision making even in the absence
of review. It may force arbitrators to think systematically about
claims and take into account various interests, legal authorities, and
factual complexity.274 However, as legal realists have long pointed
out, this requirement may instead simply spur the decision-maker’s
ingenuity.275 Where the law is vague and unsettled—as it is in the
area of state liability for denials of justice—little ingenuity is needed
to justify any particular result. Customary international law allows a
decision-maker to draw upon (or ignore) many sources in crafting
reasons. In dealing with these claims, arbitrators are even less constrained than they normally are in the absence of effective review.
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS

There are several alternative ways to reduce problems posed
by arbitrating denial-of-justice claims under the current NAFTA investor-state procedures. One is simply to amend the treaty to bar denial-of-justice claims to say that the actions of a country’s judicial system may never constitute violations of NAFTA.276 This approach
seems extreme, however, in light of well-established principles of international law and NAFTA’s goals to reduce discrimination against
foreign goods and investors. U.S. investors may suffer. Eliminating
denial-of-justice claims would create a loophole that national or local
governments might exploit.

274. See ROBERT E. KEETON, JUDGING 137 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons,
47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 652 (1995); Lord Justice Bingham, Reasons and Reasons for Reasons:
Differences Between a Court Judgment and an Arbitration Award, 4 ARB. INT’L 141, 143
(1988); Kathleen Waits, Values, Intuitions, and Opinion Writing: The Judicial Process and State
Court Jurisdiction, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 917, 931.
275. See Rau, supra note 246, at 531 & n.164. There are other benefits to giving reasons
besides constraining arbitrators’ discretion. For example, reasons may reassure the parties that
their arguments have been heard and considered. And they may serve as effective advertising
for the arbitrators, who hope to be employed in future cases. See id. at 532, 535.
276. It may also be possible to interpret NAFTA as it currently exists to preclude denialof-justice claims, but this would be a stretch. Some might argue that NAFTA Article 1101
supports such an interpretation. Article 1101, which is titled “Scope and Coverage,” states:
“This Chapter applies to measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to: (a) investors
of another Party . . . .” It could be argued that the phrase “measures adopted or maintained”
means only legislative or executive acts, not judicial ones. But in light of the well-established
doctrine in international law that a state is responsible for the actions of its judiciary as well as
its other branches, see supra Part V.A.1, this seems implausible.
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A. An International Alternative: State-to-State Resolution of Denials
of Justice
A traditional alternative to eliminating denial-of-justice claims altogether would be a return to requiring a state to bring a claim on
behalf of its injured national. This traditional approach is used in the
WTO.277 The procedures of NAFTA Chapter 20 (governing resolution of state-to-state disputes) could be used instead. Chapter 20
governs all disputes between states except those involving subsidy
and dumping issues, which are governed by chapter 19 and a few
other narrow areas.278 A change to Chapter 20 procedures in denialof-justice cases would provide a better dispute mechanism and allow
the state to filter the serious claims that touch on sovereignty.
Chapter 20 creates a Free Trade Commission and a Secretariat to
give administrative support for resolving state-to-state disputes.279
The chapter provides a three-step process for resolving these disputes: consultation, conciliation, and arbitration. The first two steps
are required before reaching the arbitration phase.280 Consultation is
simply an exchange of information between parties and an effort to
resolve the dispute by negotiation between them.281 In the concilia277. For example, the European Community brought a complaint on behalf of the
Dutch company Akzo Chemie concerning U.S. export restrictions that were said to favor Dupont. This claim led to a panel decision. Chile has pursued the interests of its fruit export sector by bringing a number of disputes to GATT settlement. AMELIA PORGES, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 85TH MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13–14 (1993).
Proposals to grant private parties access to the GATT dispute settlement system, in order to
avoid them having to rely on their governments to take up the complaint, have not succeeded.
Proposals to modify GATT in this way have come from several sources. See, e.g., JOHN H.
JACKSON ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES 207–09 (1984); Miquel Montanà i Mora, A GATT with
Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 103, 161–62 (1993); Rudolf Ostrihansky, The Future of Dispute Settlement
Within GATT: Conciliation v. Adjudication?, in THE UNITED NATIONS DECADE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 125 (Marcel Brus
et al., eds., 1991). An investor-state dispute mechanism was not included in the WTO arrangements. See MARCEL M.T.A. BRUS, THIRD PARTY DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN AN
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 28–37, 207–08 (1995). Proposals for an investor-state provision
would add an adversarial element to the procedures that is said to be not in harmony with the
conciliatory approach to bringing governments into line with GATT rules. See PORGES, supra,
at 14.
278. The other areas include emergency actions under Chapter 8 and financial services
disputes under Chapter 14.
279. See NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 2001–02.
280. See id. art. 2008(1).
281. See id. art. 2006.
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tion phase, the Commission assists the parties in reaching a resolution but does not itself act as a decision-maker.282
Arbitration proceedings under Chapter 20 are notably different
from those under Chapter 11. Arbitrators are chosen from a roster of
up to 30 people who are put on the roster by agreement of the
NAFTA Parties for terms of three years. They are to have expertise in
law, international trade, or other matters covered by the agreement;
be independent of the parties; and comply with a code of conduct
established by the Commission.283 The panel consists of five arbitrators. The chair is chosen by agreement of the parties; if there is no
agreement, then the party chosen by lot picks a chair who is not a
citizen of that party. Each of the parties then chooses two panelists
who are citizens of the other party.284 The panel is to prepare a final
report, with any separate opinions, which the parties then transmit to
the Commission. Unless it decides otherwise, the Commission is to
publish the report fifteen days after it receives it.285
State-to-state dispute resolution would resolve some of the problems caused by the current investor-state procedures. The Chapter
20 dispute mechanism is better designed to cope with difficult questions touching sovereignty than arbitrations under Chapter 11, since
the Chapter 20 arbitrators are chosen from a roster of carefullyselected experts, the arbitrators must abide by a strict ethics code,
and their final report is made public. States filter out less serious
claims. States can take into account comity interests in reciprocal respect of legal decisions. Canada, like the United States, would not
want to see its legal system lightly treated, as might occur if denialof-justice claims became common under Chapter 11.
But Chapter 20 proceedings are far from perfect. First, panel decisions are unappealable, and proceedings are confidential.286 Second,
the implementation of the report is left rather vague. When the parties receive the report, they are to “agree on the resolution of the
282. See id. art. 2007.
283. See id. art. 2009; see also Code of Conduct for Proceedings Under NAFTA Chapters
Nineteen and Twenty, 59 Fed. Reg. 8720 (Feb. 23, 1994).
284. See NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 2011.
285. See id. art. 2017.
286. See Model Rules of Procedure for Chapter Twenty of the North American Free
Trade Agreement, Rule 35 (“The Parties shall maintain the confidentiality of the panel’s hearings, deliberations and initial report, and all written submissions to and communications with
the panel, in accordance with such procedures as may be agreed from time to time between
representatives of the Parties.”).
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dispute, which normally shall conform with the determinations and
recommendations of the panel.”287 If the panel has determined that
there has been a breach of NAFTA and the parties cannot agree on a
resolution, the winning party is entitled to suspend the benefits it
provides under NAFTA.288 This suspension should be, if possible, in
the same sector as that in which the breach occurred. The Commission may establish a separate panel to determine whether the level of
benefits suspended is “manifestly excessive.”289
Decisions of the panel, therefore, are not binding. The winner of
such an arbitration is given the right to retaliate by not having to
abide by its normal obligations under the agreement. This has potential to lead to mini trade wars, such as those going on now concerning the WTO’s decision on U.S.-produced hormone-fed beef and
other matters.290 There has been some speculation that this form of
retaliation could seriously weaken the WTO system, and the same
might occur with NAFTA.291 However, bounded retaliation seems
preferable to unbounded retaliation.292 Since states have proved extremely reluctant to accept binding dispute settlement, this sort of
mechanism may be the most effective possible. The system of retaliation interferes less with sovereignty and is less inflammatory than a
monetary award.
Perhaps the most serious disadvantage of barring investor-state
claims is that states may be reluctant to bring claims on behalf of
their nationals. States worry about straining relations with another
country and complicating other areas of interaction. They also may
decide that bringing such claims is not worth the time and effort.
Countries may be inclined to bring claims on behalf of politically
powerful constituents and ignore the claims of others. This latter

287. NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 2018(1).
288. See id. art. 2019(1).
289. Id. art. 2019(3).
290. See Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for
World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 349 (1995); Kishore Gawande & Wendy L. Hansen, Retaliation, Bargaining, and the Pursuit of “Free and Fair” Trade, 53 INT’L ORG. 117 (1999);
Kim Van der Borght, The Review of the WTO Understanding on Dispute Settlement: Some Reflections on the Current Debate, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1223 (1999).
291. See, e.g., Van der Borght, supra note 290, at 1232; Matthew Schaefer, National Review of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: In the Name of Sovereignty or Enhanced WTO Rule
Compliance?, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 307, 335 (1996).
292. See, e.g., Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution Regimes in International Trade Organizations, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 697, 712 (1999).
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possibility is especially troubling because NAFTA was designed to
encourage transnational interaction by smaller (and less influential)
businesses in particular.293
B. A National Alternative: Changes in Federal Diversity
Requirements and Removal Statutes
Scholars of international law are naturally apt to search for international solutions to international problems. But sometimes solutions lie at the national level. One alternative for resolving the denialof-justice difficulty is an old idea: allow removal of cases involving
aliens to federal court. The U.S. Constitution provides that the judicial power of the federal courts “shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.”294 The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the federal
circuit courts “original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the
several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where . . . an alien is a party.”295 This was the Founders’ solution to the problems of bias in state courts, but the subsequent complete diversity rule has undermined that solution. This section will
explore the Founders’ view, examine the complete diversity rule, and
suggest how the complete diversity rule might be modified to protect aliens from denials of justice in state courts.
1. The Founders’ vision
The Founders explicitly contemplated removal to federal court as
a remedy for state-court bias against aliens. State-court bias against
aliens caused the Founders great concern because, in the postrevolutionary period, state courts were making it difficult or impossible for British creditors to collect debts owed by U.S. citizens.296

293. This concern with medium-sized and smaller businesses is evident in the inclusion of
NAFTA Article 2022, which requires an Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes
to report to the NAFTA Commission on the availability, use, and effectiveness of arbitration
and other dispute resolution procedures in the free trade area. See Terms of Reference for
NAFTA Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes, (visited Feb. 16, 2001)
<http://www.ita.doc.gov/legal/adr_term.htm>.
294. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Eleventh Amendment modified this provision to exclude from federal judicial power suits brought by citizens or subjects of foreign countries
against one of the states. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
295. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
296. See Wythe Holt, The Origins of Alienage Jurisdiction, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
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This obstruction was a violation of the United States’ obligations
under the 1783 Treaty of Paris and threatened the flow of muchneeded capital into the new country.297
Alexander Hamilton was the most outspoken supporter of
alienage jurisdiction in the constitutional debates. Hamilton, writing
in Federalist 80, made very clear that such diversity jurisdiction for
aliens was necessary in order to fulfill the United States’ obligations
under international law and to preserve good relations with other nations.298 The federal judicial power, he said, should extend to all
cases involving “the PEACE of the CONFEDERACY, whether they relate to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations
or to that between the States themselves.”299 Federal courts should
handle such matters because “the peace of the WHOLE ought not to
be left at the disposal of a PART.”300 He anticipated that the United
States would be held responsible for state violations of international
law: “The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers
for the conduct of its members.”301 Therefore, the federal government should have the means of preventing such violations: “the responsibility for an injury ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it.”302 The consequences of injustice to foreigners
in state courts could be grave, and the best means of avoiding it

547, 553–62 (1989) (describing post-revolutionary debt crisis and anti-British creditor actions
of state courts and legislatures); Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of
1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1430–53 (describing
post-revolutionary debt crisis and anti-British creditor actions of state courts and legislatures);
John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3,
24 (1948).
297. Article IV of the Treaty of Paris provided that foreign creditors would “meet with
no lawful Impediment to the Recovery of the full Value . . . of all bona fide Debts heretofore
contracted.” Treaty of Paris, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 4, 8 Stat. 80, 82. Secretary for
Foreign Affairs John Jay wrote a lengthy memorandum to the Continental Congress in 1786
detailing massive American violations of Article IV and arguing that these violations might
provoke war and damage the commercial prospects of the new nation. 31 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 781–884 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1934). James
Wilson of Pennsylvania also expressed concern about the United States’ ability to attract capital
if state courts could continue to discriminate against foreign creditors. 2 DEBATES ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 491–93 (Jonathan Elliot ed. 1987) [hereinafter
Elliot].
298. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 1, at 475.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 476.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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would be to hear such cases in federal court. “As the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of courts, as well as in any other
manner, is with reason classed among the just causes of war, it will
follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all
causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned.”303
Hamilton acknowledged that some might argue that the federal
courts should hear only cases arising under treaties and the law of nations and not those that concerned only local law. He argued that
both types of cases should be heard in the federal courts. Denial of
justice in cases concerning local law might itself violate international
law. “[I]t is at least problematical whether an unjust sentence against
a foreigner, where the subject of controversy was wholly relative to
the lex loci, would not, if unredressed, be an aggression upon his
sovereign, as well as one which violated the stipulations in a treaty or
the general law of nations.”304 In addition, it could be very difficult
to distinguish between cases involving local law and those involving
national questions when a foreigner was a party.305
Implicit in Hamilton’s discussion of federal court jurisdiction
over aliens was the problem of bias in state courts. He warned
against the “prevalency of a local spirit” in state courts and worried
that the judges of certain states, “holding their offices during pleasure [of the legislature or executive], or from year to year, will be too
little independent to be relied upon” for impartial application of the
laws.306 John Jay also expressed concern about state courts and “the
different local laws and interests which may affect and influence
them.”307 His concern was supported by his report on state courts’
failure to comply with the Treaty of Paris.308 At the Philadelphia
Constitutional Convention of 1787 and elsewhere, James Madison
several times referred to the need for protection against state court
bias. At one point he bluntly said, “Confidence cannot be put in the
State Tribunals as guardians of the National authority and inter303. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations toward
all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually
done by one national government than it could be . . . by thirteen separate States . . . .”).
304. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 1, 476–77.
305. See id.
306. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 486 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
307. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, supra note 303, at 43.
308. See supra note 297.

294

4LET-FIN.DOC

229]

2/22/01 8:19 PM

International Pressure to Harmonize

ests.”309 Referring to alienage jurisdiction, he asked, “Could there be
a more favorable or eligible provision to avoid controversies with
foreign powers? Ought it to be put in the power of a member of the
Union to drag the whole community?”310 James Wilson of Pennsylvania and William Davie of North Carolina made similar arguments.311 And Chief Justice Marshall, in the 1809 case Bank of the
United States v. Deveaux,312 also stated that fear of state court bias
was the motivation behind diversity jurisdiction:
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will
administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of
every description, it is not the less true that the constitution itself
either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such
indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it
has established national tribunals for the decision of controversies
between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different
states.313

It has been the fashion for some time to question whether local
bias is still a problem in the state courts, if indeed it ever was a problem. Some academics and federal judges have argued that the supposed advantages to removal are chimerical and that diversity jurisdiction only congests federal courts. In their view, diversity
jurisdiction should be severely curtailed or even abolished altogether.314
309. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 27 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed., 1927). In the debate over whether to have lower federal courts, Madison referred to
British debt cases and asked, “What was to be done after improper Verdicts in State tribunals
obtained under the biased directions of a dependent Judge, or the local prejudices of an undirected jury?” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 124 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed., 1927).
310. 3 Elliot, supra note 297, at 533–34 (Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions).
311. 2 Elliot, supra note 297, at 491–93 (Wilson); 4 Elliot, supra note 297, at 158–59
(Davie) (“[T]he denial of justice is one of the just causes of war. If these controversies were left
to the decision of particular states, it would be in their power, at any time, to involve the continent in a war . . . . It is clear that where the peace of the Union is affected, the general judiciary ought to decide.”).
312. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
313. Id. at 87.
314. The literature on diversity jurisdiction is huge. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 210–221 (1996) (discussing literature);
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 23 (5th ed. 1994) (summarizing
literature). One of the most formidable foes of diversity jurisdiction was Judge Henry Friendly.
See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 139–52 (1973); see also
Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13
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Today, because of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,315 federal diversity jurisdiction cannot solve problems of bias in state substantive
law (or at least not to any great extent). Federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply the state law, biased or not. Judge
Henry Friendly suggested that, in part, federal diversity jurisdiction
was meant to correct for biased state substantive law.316 Indeed, former West Virginia Chief Justice Richard Neely has argued that
elected judges’ incentives have affected the substantive tort law of
many states.317 Long before Erie, Justice Story said general common
law should apply in alienage cases.318 In light of Erie, there seems little prospect of returning to Swift v. Tyson-style319 general common
law in cases involving aliens.
Still, the Founders’ remarks suggest that diversity jurisdiction was
designed to address bias in the application of the law. The denial-ofjustice claims focus on the same problem, and diversity jurisdiction
could help.320 Out-of-state corporate defendants and aliens generally
believe that federal courts provide them with a more impartial forum.321 Federal judges are not elected and receive no campaign contributions. To ensure their independence and insulation from interest group pressure, they hold tenure during good behavior and their
salaries cannot be diminished.322 Federal judges may have political

CORNELL L.Q. 499, 520–23 (1928); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction:
Positive Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1979); Larry
Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97, 121–22. The arguments over parity between federal and state courts concerning diversity jurisdiction overlap with arguments about
federal question jurisdiction.
315. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several
States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1474–93
(1997) (explaining the constitutional basis of the Court’s decision in Erie).
316. Henry J. Friendly, Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483,
495 (1928).
317. NEELY, supra note 121, at 4, 53.
318. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 1691–94, at 568–71 (1833). Story stated that the “law to be administered in cases
of foreigners is often very distinct from the mere municipal code of a state, and dependent
upon the law merchant, or the more enlarged consideration of international rights and duties,
in the case of conflict of the foreign and domestic laws.” Id at 570.
319. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
320. Erie itself suggested the goal of federal diversity jurisdiction was to provide a neutral
forum. See 304 U.S. at 74.
321. See infra Part V.B.1.
322. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78, 79, at 464–75 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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and other biases, but at least they are not directly beholden to certain
interests for their continuance on the bench.
2. The complete diversity requirement
A major stumbling block to removal to federal court has been
the requirement of complete diversity. Where the interests are joint,
each party on one side must be diverse from each party on the other
side.323 This complete diversity is required to remove a case from
state to federal court, and an action is removable only if none of the
defendants with joint interests are citizens of the state in which the
action is brought.324 These rules regarding complete diversity and
removal allow plaintiffs to control removal to some extent. In order
to defeat complete diversity, plaintiffs often join a local defendant,
who often contributes little to a final resolution.325 For example, in a
products liability case, plaintiffs might name a local dealer as well as
an out-of-state manufacturer as defendants. The true target is obviously the out-of-state manufacturer’s deep pockets. The Loewen case
provides a classic example of a similar maneuver: the Canadian and
Delaware corporations were the actual targets, but O’Keefe also
joined much smaller Mississippi corporations owned by Loewen,
such as the Wright & Ferguson Funeral Home, to defeat diversity.
Loewen mentions in its notice of claim that O’Keefe thereby “made
it impossible for Loewen to remove the case to federal court,

where all judges are appointed and have life tenure, and are
thus not beholden to any particular local constituency.”326
3. Abandoning the complete diversity requirement as to aliens
Abandoning the complete diversity requirement—at least as to
aliens—and allowing parties such as Loewen to remove cases to federal court would help considerably to prevent state court denials of
justice for which the United States is liable under international
law.327 The current complete diversity requirement allows parties to

323. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806).
324. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)-(b) (1994).
325. See Bill Aims to Get More Class Actions Under Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 67
U.S.L.W. 2707 (June 1, 1999) [hereinafter Bill Aims].
326. Loewen’s Notice of Claim, supra note 34, at 14–15.
327. Even those who have opposed diversity jurisdiction generally have advocated retaining it in alienage cases and even applying a minimal diversity test to such cases. See, e.g., Rowe,
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defeat removal to federal court on technicalities irrelevant to the actual dispute. Hamilton’s goal of preventing international strife is thus
frustrated. Abandoning the complete diversity requirement as to
aliens may be the solution that is least damaging to federalism concerns. How might this be done?
The complete diversity requirement is not to be found in the
words of the Constitution nor on the face of the diversity statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1332. It is a long-standing judicial construction of the statute, which dates back to Chief Justice Marshall’s 1806 opinion in
Strawbridge v. Curtiss,328 construing the Judiciary Act of 1789
(which contained no specific language on the question). The opinion
in Strawbridge is only a few sentences long and gives no reasoning
for the decision, but federal courts have followed Strawbridge ever
since. One could argue that, since Strawbridge, joinder rules have
become much less restrictive, so a change in the complete diversity
rule is now justified.329
The Supreme Court, in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Tashire,330 held that the complete diversity rule is a statutory construction, not a constitutional requirement. Also in that case, the
Court construed the federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335,
to require only “minimal diversity”—diversity of citizenship simply
between two or more claimants—rather than complete diversity.
Like the other jurisdictional statutes, § 1335 did not specify exactly
what type of diversity was required; in requiring only minimal diversity, the Court said it considered “[t]he language of the statute, the
legislative purpose . . ., and the consistent judicial interpretation tacitly accepted by Congress” not to require complete diversity in inter-

supra note 314, at 967 (briefly discussing alienage jurisdiction and favoring minimal diversity
in such cases largely because of “possible effects on the foreign relations of the United States”);
Kramer, supra note 314, at 122 (same). See also REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 39–40 (1990) (recommending abolition of diversity jurisdiction except for suits
involving aliens and interpleader); H.R. 6691, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (bill that would
have abolished diversity jurisdiction but retained alienage jurisdiction); Johnson, supra note
143, at 58 (“The complete alienage requirement . . . fails to appreciate fully the foreign relations implications raised if an alien is a party to a lawsuit.”).
328. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
329. In addressing diversity and removal, however, Congress and the courts have tried to
compensate for more permissive modern joinder rules with doctrines concerning “separate and
independent . . . cause[s] of action,” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1994), and “additional parties,” id.
§ 1332(a)(3).
330. 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967).
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pleader cases.331 The Supreme Court has proved willing to modify
the complete diversity requirement in certain contexts.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided whether complete diversity is required in a case involving an alien. The lower courts have
assumed that complete diversity is required, often citing the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Ed and Fred, Inc. v. Puritan Marine Insurance
Underwriters Corp.332
Judicial decision could possibly abolish the complete diversity requirement for cases involving aliens. But this is unlikely for several
reasons. The complete diversity requirement has acquired the authoritative patina of time, and judges are loathe to disturb longstanding statutory constructions.333 Judges tend to be opposed to
expansion of federal jurisdiction, particularly diversity jurisdiction,
arguing that it overloads federal courts.334 Finally, the removal statute, § 1441, requires that none of the defendants be a citizen of the
state where the action was brought.335
The better course for abolishing the complete diversity requirement as to aliens would be congressional action. Congress need only
amend the removal statute to provide that an alien can always remove a case to federal court, regardless of other parties’ diversity, in
the same manner that a foreign state can.336 Additionally, it would be
possible to give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over alienage
cases.337 But this seems unnecessary because, in practice, foreign de331. Id. at 530.
332. 506 F.2d 757, 758 (1975).
333. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
334. For example, the Judicial Conference of the United States voted in March 1999 to
oppose bills that would permit minimal diversity and eliminate the amount in controversy requirement for suits concerning Year 2000 computer failures. The Conference’s statement said
that the bills could potentially cause a massive overload of the federal court system, “resulting
in substantial costs and delays.” Judicial Council Headed by Chief Justice Registers Opposition to
Year 2000 Bills, 67 U.S.L.W. 2555 (Mar. 23, 1999).
335. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994).
336. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) provides that “[a]ny civil action brought in a State court
against a foreign state . . . may be removed by the foreign state to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.”
The section further provides that the case shall be tried in federal court without a jury, which
may well be important given the extra care necessary in dealing with sovereign states, but perhaps would not be so significant in a case involving private parties. In addition, the section
provides that the time limitations for removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) may be enlarged “at
time for any cause shown,” which would make sense in the alienage context as well.
337. See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) (“Congressional power to ordain
and establish inferior courts includes the power ‘of investing them with jurisdiction either lim-
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fendants would probably remove and might as well be given the
choice. If they could remove, but chose not to, and a denial of justice resulted in state court, they arguably failed to take advantage of a
remedy provided and so cannot claim damages against the United
States under agreements such as NAFTA.338
After the case is filed, changing circumstances may affect diversity
jurisdiction. For example, a foreign defendant might be joined in a
case after the initial filing. The longstanding rule is that a case cannot
be removed on the basis of diversity unless the required diversity existed both at the commencement of the suit and at the time of filing
the petition for removal.339 An exception exists if the plaintiffs’ voluntary action (including dismissal or settlement) causes a change in
circumstances.340 To prevent discrimination against aliens, an alien
ought to be able to remove whether joined by a plaintiff or defendant.341 If this rule should prove too burdensome to the federal system, then removal could be allowed at least where the alien was
joined by a plaintiff. As is the case with cases involving foreign
states, the strict time limits for removal in § 1446(b) ought not to
apply in alienage cases.342
Shifting these cases from state to federal court is of course not
without cost to the federal judicial system. The Association of Trial
Lawyers of America (“ATLA”), a pro-plaintiff’s lawyer group, claims
that the proposed class action reform allowing greater removal to
federal court “would cause an even greater backlog of the civil dockets [in federal court], eventually discouraging consumers from ever
bringing their cases.”343 However, backlogs in state courts are often
greater than those in federal courts; measures transferring cases to
federal court might actually improve the situation by relieving the
harder-pressed state courts.344

ited, concurrent, or exclusive . . . .’” (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (How.) 236, 245
(1845)).
338. See infra discussion of exhaustion of local remedies rule.
339. See Gibson v. Bruce, 108 U.S. 561, 563 (1883).
340. See numerous cases cited at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446, ann. 484–90 (West 1999).
341. This is the case with the removal rules governing foreign states. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(d) (1994).
342. See id.
343. Congress, Judicial Conference Mull Changes to Class Action, Mass Tort Rules, supra
note 129, at 2724 (quotation of Carlton Carl of ATLA).
344. See POSNER, supra note 314, at 219.
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In any case, alienage cases form a relatively small proportion of
the docket. According to the most recent data available from the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (for the year ending June
30, 2000), the total number of diversity cases filed in federal court,
including cases removed, was 49,603.345 Of these, foreigners were
listed as defendants in 1,136 cases, or 2.3% of the total diversity
cases. (Foreigners were listed as plaintiffs in 1,353 cases, or 2.7% of
the total.)
Allowing aliens more power to remove to federal court may be
politically feasible. Congress recently has attempted to modify diversity requirements in other contexts, notably class actions.346 During
the last Congress, both the House and the Senate were working on
legislation that would permit removal of many more class actions to
federal court by abolishing the traditional requirement that every defendant be diverse from every named plaintiff.347 The House approved its version, while the Senate Judiciary Committee reported its
version to the floor last June.348 According to its supporters, the
measure was necessary in part to prevent plaintiff’s attorneys from
capitalizing on political goodwill with their local elected judges.349
The bills had enthusiastic business support. It seems that business
groups have shifted their tactics somewhat from focus on changes in
substantive law, through tort and punitive damages reform, to focus
on changes in procedure.350

345. This statistic and the ones that follow were provided by the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, Analysis and Reports Branch, Statistics Division. The information is
derived from the civil cover sheets of cases filed.
346. Congress has also tinkered with diversity jurisdiction for aliens by amending the diversity statute in 1988 to provide that “an alien admitted to the United States for permanent
residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a) (1994).
347. See S. 353, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. (1999); see also House
Judiciary Committee Approves Bill Vastly Expanding Federal Class Action Power, 68 U.S.L.W.
2068 (Aug. 10, 1999); Bill Aims, supra note 325, at 2707. The requirement for diversity in
class actions that every named plaintiff be diverse to every defendant was established in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
348. Senate Judiciary OKs Class Action Bill, Rejects Attempts to Carve Out Exemptions, 69
U.S.L.W. 2006, 2006–07 (July 4, 2000). A filibuster was threatened. Id.
349. See Congress, Judicial Conference Mull Changes to Class Action, Mass Tort Rules, supra note 129, at 2723.
350. See id. at 2724 (remarks attributed to Sherman Joyce, president of the American
Tort Reform Association).
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Procedural changes such as allowing removal in more cases may
prove to be much more politically palatable than broad-based federal
tort reform. And they may even work to solve the problem better,
since more of the biggest verdicts are being awarded in contract disputes, for example.351 If the federal government altered the law of
torts, or even contracts, ingenious plaintiffs’ lawyers and judges
could likely find new ways of transferring money from out-of-state
defendants to in-state plaintiffs. It would be far better to remove
these cases altogether from the state systems.
Foreign interests often do not have the same domestic clout as
U.S. commercial interests, but they do have NAFTA and a certain
degree of international pressure on their side. If the Loewen arbitration produces an award against the United States, and, even if it does
not but there is still danger of such awards, this could provide a spur
against Congress’s normal inertia. The prospect of paying out hundreds of millions of dollars to compensate foreigners for denials of
justice in state courts—with the accompanying loss to U.S. prestige
around the world—might galvanize Congress’ will to act.
4. The difference a federal forum makes for aliens
Litigating a case in federal rather than state court would make a
difference to aliens in several ways. The most important difference,
which the analysis in Part III.B has already suggested, is the nature
of the judges. Federal judges are not elected and have life tenure. As
other commentators have noted, they are therefore likely to be less
sensitive to popular xenophobia352 and not apt to favor lawyers (especially those of in-state plaintiffs) who contribute to judicial campaigns. This relative lack of bias and favoritism may be manifested in
various ways. For one thing, federal judges would probably be more
likely to restrain lawyers’ rhetorical excesses in playing to jurors’
prejudices and generally to keep a firmer control of their courtroom,
not ceding it entirely to the plaintiff’s lawyers.
In addition, federal judges would be more likely to apply the
substantive law fairly. Of course, because of Erie R. Company v.
351. See Galanter, supra note 5, at 1133; Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1, 8; MARK PETERSON ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 23–24 (1987).
352. See Johnson, supra note 143. The empirical study of Clermont and Eisenberg suggests that bias against foreigners is not common in federal court. See Clermont and Eisenberg,
supra note 143.
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Thompkins,353 federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law. But many state laws allow considerable discretion in the laws’ application. For example, although state standards for review of punitive damages must be followed,354 federal
courts may be more likely to exercise powers of remittitur. Empirical
studies have suggested that these differences between federal and
state judges are significant in cases involving in-state plaintiffs and
out-of-state defendants.355
Besides differences in judges, there may be significant differences
in law. Federal procedural law may be more favorable to aliens in
Loewen’s position than state procedures. State appeal bond requirements, for instance, most likely do not apply to cases removed to
federal court.356 Of lesser importance, but perhaps still significant, is
the fact that federal juries tend to be drawn from a broader geographic area than state juries,357 reducing the chance that juries will
be exclusively drawn from one very populist and xenophobic area. In
short, abandoning the complete diversity rule in alienage cases is not
a panacea that will solve all problems facing aliens in American
courts, but it should improve the situation considerably.
VII. CONCLUSION
The denial-of-justice doctrine poses a challenge to our legal system. As global trade grows, this challenge cannot be ignored if the
United States is to retain its credibility as it urges other countries to
adopt the rule of law and accountable legal systems. Even a few extreme verdicts against foreign corporations or individuals damages

353. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
354. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
355. See Helland & Tabarrok, Electoral Institutions, supra note 131.
356. See Burlington Northern R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987) (holding that Alabama
rule requiring unsuccessful appellant to pay 10% of judgment as an affirmance penalty does not
apply to federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction). But see Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (upholding application of a state bond requirement for shareholder derivative actions even though Rule 23.1 is silent about such a requirement; the case
predates Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) but is still good law).
357. See Johnson, supra note 143, at 54–55. Johnson focuses on the fact that drawing
jurors from a narrow pool may sometimes help aliens, since the pool in a certain small area
such as San Francisco may be more cosmopolitan and less biased against aliens than the
broader pool in the Northern District of California. However, the dangers of a local pool
would seem to be greater than the possible benefits for aliens. Plaintiffs often take care to lay
venue in more biased areas, which is easier to do in state court.
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the foreign perception of the United States’ commitment to justice.
International solutions to the problem could be adopted, but
they are likely to generate great friction within the United States.
Decisions of international tribunals provide a ready focus for discontent. As far as possible, it makes sense to find national solutions to
international problems, to adjust our national law to avoid international conflict. This was precisely the type of solution the Founders
had in mind when they advocated alienage jurisdiction in the federal
courts. The United States was preoccupied with building good foreign relations then, as a new nation struggling to keep the peace and
to develop economically. Now again we find ourselves in a world in
which international trade is vitally important. By eliminating the
complete diversity requirement for aliens, we may manage to kill two
birds with one stone: alleviate some of the most serious problems
with our civil justice system and fulfill our international obligations.
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